Reverse Sequential Proportional Approval Voting Rule: Proportionality and Approximation Guarantees
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Abstract (arXiv)
We study the Reverse Sequential Proportional Approval Voting Rule (RevSeqPAV) in approval-based committee elections. Despite its historical prominence and practical use, its properties and guarantees are much less understood than those of Sequential PAV. We analyze it along two dimensions: proportional representation (measured by Extended Justified Representation, its approximations, and proportionality degree) and approximation of the maximum PAV score of instances. We first establish strong negative results for general, unrestricted election instances and then identify settings in which the rule provides meaningful fairness and optimization guarantees.
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References · 13
- 2014Justified Representation in Approval-Based Committee Votingcited by 42
- 2020Multi-Winner Voting with Approval Preferencescited by 37
- 2014Finding a Collective Set of Items: From Proportional Multirepresentation to Group Recommendationcited by 13
- 2014Computational Aspects of Multi-Winner Approval Votingcited by 11
- 2016Proportional Rankingscited by 10
- 2022Online Approval Committee Electionscited by 9
- 2018Proportionality Degree of Multiwinner Rulescited by 7
- 2023Approval-Based Committee Voting in Practice: A Case Study of (Over-)Representation in the Polkadot Blockchaincited by 7
- 2016Phragm'en's and Thiele's election methodscited by 5
- 2021Dynamic Proportional Rankingscited by 4
- 2023Ties in Multiwinner Approval Votingcited by 3
- 2022Robustness of Greedy Approval Rulescited by 2
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