Dynamic Proportional Rankings
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Abstract (arXiv)
Proportional ranking rules aggregate approval-style preferences of agents into a collective ranking such that groups of agents with similar preferences are adequately represented. Motivated by the application of live Q&A platforms, where submitted questions need to be ranked based on the interests of the audience, we study a dynamic extension of the proportional rankings setting. In our setting, the goal is to maintain the proportionality of a ranking when alternatives (i.e., questions) -- not necessarily from the top of the ranking -- get selected sequentially. We propose generalizations of well-known aggregation rules to this setting and study their monotonicity and proportionality properties. We also evaluate the performance of these rules experimentally, using realistic probabilistic assumptions on the selection procedure.
Key facts. Cited by 4 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). First posted on arXiv 17 May 2021.
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Citing papers per year: 2021: 1; 2022: 1; 2023: 0; 2024: 0; 2025: 1; 2026: 1.
4 papers.
- 2022Online Approval Committee Electionscited by 9
- 2021DiRe Committee : Diversity and Representation Constraints in Multiwinner Electionscited by 3
- 2025Representative Ranking for Deliberation in the Public Spherecited by 2
- 2026Reverse Sequential Proportional Approval Voting Rule: Proportionality and Approximation Guaranteescited by 0
- 2026Reverse Sequential Proportional Approval Voting Rule: Proportionality and Approximation Guarantees28 Sep 2026
- 2025Representative Ranking for Deliberation in the Public Sphere19 Mar 2025
- 2022Online Approval Committee Elections14 Feb 2022
- 2021DiRe Committee : Diversity and Representation Constraints in Multiwinner Elections15 Jul 2021