mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

Story Imprinting: AI Assistants Absorb Traits from Human Characters They Resemble

arXiv 2609.10883 ↗First posted 9 Sep 2026cs.LG cs.AI cs.CLcited by 0

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Abstract (arXiv)

Language models are trained to implement a helpful AI Assistant character (e.g., Claude). We explore how finetuning on synthetic stories affects this character. Does it change the Assistant's behavior in multi-turn conversations with users, a format quite different from the stories? And does the Assistant adopt the behaviors and preferences of human characters? We refer to this adoption as story imprinting. We finetune GPT-4.1 and Kimi-K2.6 on stories in which generally helpful human characters give subtly harmful advice after being insulted. The Assistant adopts the same conditional behavior while otherwise remaining helpful. This occurs even when fewer than 2% of stories depict the behavior. In a separate experiment, the Assistant adopts preferences that are only implicit in the narration. A human character's body language suggests they dislike working on spreadsheets, yet they never say so and continue giving good advice on spreadsheets. After finetuning, the Assistant becomes less likely to choose spreadsheet tasks. Next we ask which characters most influence the Assistant. We find the Assistant adopts behaviors more often from characters that resemble it (e.g., helpful rather than dismissive). We call this the affinity effect. The effect extends to other personas elicited with system prompts: unhelpful personas adopt behaviors from unhelpful characters. We also observe it in finetuned base models. We use the affinity effect to learn how models represent the Assistant. We find the Assistant adopts behaviors more from characters affiliated with elite universities (e.g., Yale) than non-elite ones. This implies the model's internal representation of the Assistant is more similar to humans from elite universities. Overall, the Assistant can be influenced by stories that depict only human characters (no AIs), which may conflict with the Persona Selection Model for the Assistant.

Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 24 of its 41 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 9 Sep 2026.

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References · 24

  1. 2021A General Language Assistant as a Laboratory for Alignmentcited by 1,055
  2. 2024Alignment faking in large language modelscited by 360
  3. 2025Persona Vectors: Monitoring and Controlling Character Traits in Language Modelscited by 345
  4. 2023Studying Large Language Model Generalization with Influence Functionscited by 326
  5. 2024Deliberative Alignment: Reasoning Enables Safer Language Modelscited by 308
  6. 2025Emergent Misalignment: Narrow finetuning can produce broadly misaligned LLMscited by 172
  7. 2023Taken out of context: On measuring situational awareness in LLMscited by 143
  8. 2025Tell me about yourself: LLMs are aware of their learned behaviorscited by 91
  9. 2026The Assistant Axis: Situating and Stabilizing the Default Persona of Language Modelscited by 90
  10. 2025Persona Features Control Emergent Misalignmentcited by 86
  11. 2025Auditing language models for hidden objectivescited by 83
  12. 2025Poisoning Attacks on LLMs Require a Near-constant Number of Poison Samplescited by 72
12 more
  1. 2025Weird Generalization and Inductive Backdoors: New Ways to Corrupt LLMscited by 55
  2. 2026Alignment Pretraining: AI Discourse Causes Self-Fulfilling (Mis)alignmentcited by 33
  3. 2025Believe It or Not: How Deeply do LLMs Believe Implanted Facts?cited by 24
  4. 2025Open Character Training: Shaping the Persona of AI Assistants through Constitutional AIcited by 24
  5. 2026Model Spec Midtraining: Improving How Alignment Training Generalizescited by 20
  6. 2024Future Events as Backdoor Triggers: Investigating Temporal Vulnerabilities in LLMscited by 15
  7. 2025Revisiting Backdoor Attacks on LLMs: A Stealthy and Practical Poisoning Framework via Harmless Inputscited by 10
  8. 2023Tell, don't show: Declarative facts influence how LLMs generalizecited by 9
  9. 2024Connecting the Dots: LLMs can Infer and Verbalize Latent Structure from Disparate Training Datacited by 7
  10. 2026Tracing Persona Vectors Through LLM Pretrainingcited by 7
  11. 2026Phantom Transfer: Data Poisoning can Survive Data-Level Defencescited by 6
  12. 2026Negation Neglect: When models fail to learn negations in trainingcited by 6

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