From Review to Authorization: Key-Isolated Threshold Signing for LLM Agents
On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance
Abstract (arXiv)
Autonomous LLM agents can turn untrusted content into effectful actions such as payments and permission changes. If the same process interprets this content and controls a reusable signing credential, prompt injection can cross the judgment boundary and reach execution authority. We present KITA, a review-to-authorization architecture that keeps the user's personal secret signing key and every threshold signing-key share outside all LLM processes. Under threshold signature unforgeability and our system assumptions, compromising the proposer and fewer than t reviewer-signer domains cannot produce a valid authorization for a new action without signing contributions from t distinct domains. Thus, any such authorization includes a share from an uncompromised domain, bound to the canonical action and released only after authenticated reviewer approval. This establishes execution-bound authorization integrity. We implement the complete reviewer-to-executor path with a structured-output LLM adapter and threshold BLS. Six system tests validate quorum gating and message binding at this interface, while cryptographic microbenchmarks measure the online signing path and its scaling behavior.
Key facts. Cited by 1 paper in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 8 of its 28 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 5 Sep 2026.
Builds on
8 of 28 references.
Closest ancestors · 4
Same direction, newest first
- 2026Bounded Agents: Delegation Security for Multi-Agent AI Systems16 Aug
- 2025Progent: Securing AI Agents with Privilege Control16 Apr
- 2025Defeating Prompt Injections by Design24 Mar
- 2024InjecAgent: Benchmarking Indirect Prompt Injections in Tool-Integrated Large Language Model Agents5 Mar
Other references · 4
- 2023Improving Factuality and Reasoning in Language Models through Multiagent Debatecited by 1,739
- 2024Replacing Judges with Juries: Evaluating LLM Generations with a Panel of Diverse Modelscited by 301
- 2025Debate or Vote: Which Yields Better Decisions in Multi-Agent Large Language Models?cited by 74
- 2015Keeping Authorities "Honest or Bust" with Decentralized Witness Cosigningcited by 3
Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2026: 1.
1 paper.
Similar, not cited
Close in wording, no citation either way
- 2026Trust propagation and structural containment in Multi-agent LLM pipelines
- 2026Rewriting the Response Path: Silent Tampering and Provider-Signed Defense in BYOK LLM Agents
- 2025Verifiability-First Agents: Provable Observability and Lightweight Audit Agents for Controlling Autonomous LLM Systems
- 2026Capability Gates Are Not Authorization: Confused-Deputy Failures in LLM Agent Frameworks
- 2026Delegation Without Trust: An Empirical Gap Analysis of Identity, Authorization, and Runtime Governance in Multi-Agent LLM Systems
- 2026TraceGrant: A Contract-Governed Security Framework for the Task-Effect Lifecycle of Networked LLM Agents
- 2026Securing LLM-Agent Long-Term Memory Against Poisoning: Non-Malleable, Origin-Bound Authority with Machine-Checked Guarantees
- 2026The Same Zero: Why Identical ASR Can Imply Different Guarantees in LLM-Agent Security