mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

Probe Generalization as Subspace Selection for OOD Deception Detection

arXiv 2609.02893 ↗First posted 1 Jul 2026cs.CLcited by 0

On the map: Mechanistic interpretability → Probing deception, bias and beliefs

Abstract (arXiv)

Linear probes can be used to detect behaviors and concepts inside language model activations, but may fail to transfer to out-of-distribution examples. When studying the generalization performance of Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct probes over 3 held-out deception detection datasets, we find that projecting inputs onto a small subset of principal components (PCs) from the training distribution of activations enables cross-domain transfer that nearly matches the performance of probes trained directly on the test distribution. Furthermore, we find that PC interpretations can be used to find a subset of those transferable PCs. By using an LLM judge to score each PC on whether its most/ least activating examples imply a transferable deception direction, then probing on the highest-scoring PCs, we close the baseline-to-oracle gap by 78% on Insider Trading Report and by 25% on Sandbagging. The directions a source probe weights heavily appear to encode source-specific surface features, while the directions that actually transfer appear to encode the same contrast more abstractly, in a way natural language descriptions can capture. Broadly, our results suggest that the OOD robustness of probes is largely determined by subspace selection.

Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Probing deception, bias and beliefs, one of 13 directions in Mechanistic interpretability. Builds on 16 of its 22 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 1 Jul 2026.

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16 of 22 references.

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  1. 2025Detecting Strategic Deception Using Linear Probes5 Feb

Other references · 15

  1. 2024The Llama 3 Herd of Modelscited by 14,715
  2. 2016Understanding intermediate layers using linear classifier probescited by 1,353
  3. 2024Refusal in Language Models Is Mediated by a Single Directioncited by 1,032
  4. 2022Discovering Latent Knowledge in Language Models Without Supervisioncited by 767
  5. 2023The Linear Representation Hypothesis and the Geometry of Large Language Modelscited by 716
  6. 2019Designing and Interpreting Probes with Control Taskscited by 640
  7. 2024LLMs Know More Than They Show: On the Intrinsic Representation of LLM Hallucinationscited by 244
  8. 2017All-but-the-Top: Simple and Effective Postprocessing for Word Representationscited by 212
  9. 2020Probing the Probing Paradigm: Does Probing Accuracy Entail Task Relevance?cited by 151
  10. 2025Are Sparse Autoencoders Useful? A Case Study in Sparse Probingcited by 115
  11. 2026The Assistant Axis: Situating and Stabilizing the Default Persona of Language Modelscited by 90
  12. 2026Building Production-Ready Probes For Geminicited by 47
3 more
  1. 2025Steering Out-of-Distribution Generalization with Concept Ablation Fine-Tuningcited by 39
  2. 2025False Sense of Security: Why Probing-based Malicious Input Detection Fails to Generalizecited by 19
  3. 2025The Impact of Off-Policy Training Data on Probe Generalisationcited by 9

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  1. 2026One Probe Won't Catch Them All: Towards Targeted Deception Detection
  2. 2026Caught in the Act: Probes Effectively Detect Sabotage and Catch Unverbalized Deception
  3. 2026Linear Probe Accuracy Scales with Model Size and Benefits from Multi-Layer Ensembling
  4. 2025Caught in the Act: a mechanistic approach to detecting deception
  5. 2026Pressure-Testing Deception Probes in LLMs: Scaling, Robustness, and the Geometry of Deceptive Representations
  6. 2026Decodability is Not Causality: Dissociating Probe Readouts from Behavioral Drivers via SAE Decomposition
  7. 2026Beyond Liars' Bench: The Impact of Lie Typology, Depth, and Sparsity on Deception Detection in LLMs
  8. 2026Decoding Hidden Deception in Reasoning LLMs: Activation Explainers for Deception Auditing