mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

Will the User Ever Know? Covert Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks on Tool-Using LLM Agents

arXiv 2608.30362 ↗First posted 31 Aug 2026cs.AI cs.CLcited by 0

On the map: LLM safety and security → Prompt injection and agent security

Abstract (arXiv)

As LLM agents take real-world actions through tools, indirect prompt injection (IPI) has emerged as a serious threat. The standard metric, Attack Success Rate (ASR), counts whether an injection succeeds but ignores what the user notices in the agent's final response. Looking at successful injection traces, we find two distinct outcomes: the agent executes the injection while returning an otherwise normal response, or reports the injected action in its final response, giving the user a chance to notice. We call these covert and overt successes. From the user's perspective, we decompose ASR into the Covert Success Rate (CSR), counting successes leaving no trace in the final response, and the Overt Success Rate (OSR), counting successes the user can detect. To understand what drives the gap, we analyze successful trajectories and find that the agent's behavior after the injection separates covert from overt: covert traces hand control back to the user task before ending, while overt traces end at the attack itself. This split follows from the ReAct format, where the final response summarizes the most recent action. Building on this observation, we propose ICoA (Induced Covert Attack), an IPI attack designed to induce covert outcomes by steering the agent back to the user task after executing the injection. Across four target models on AgentDojo, ICoA achieves the highest CSR, with gains of 3.79-12.01 percentage points over the strongest baseline.

Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Prompt injection and agent security, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security. Builds on 24 of its 41 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 31 Aug 2026.

Builds on

24 of 41 references.

Closest ancestors · 9

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2026MUZZLE: Adaptive Agentic Red-Teaming of Web Agents Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks9 Feb
  2. 2025ChatInject: Abusing Chat Templates for Prompt Injection in LLM Agents26 Sep
  3. 2025VPI-Bench: Visual Prompt Injection Attacks for Computer-Use Agents3 Jun
  4. 2025Defending against Indirect Prompt Injection by Instruction Detection8 May
  5. 2025WASP: Benchmarking Web Agent Security Against Prompt Injection Attacks22 Apr
  6. 2024Agent Security Bench (ASB): Formalizing and Benchmarking Attacks and Defenses in LLM-based Agents3 Oct
  7. 2024The Instruction Hierarchy: Training LLMs to Prioritize Privileged Instructions19 Apr
  8. 2024Defending Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks With Spotlighting20 Mar
  9. 2023Formalizing and Benchmarking Prompt Injection Attacks and Defenses19 Oct

Other references · 15

  1. 2024The Llama 3 Herd of Modelscited by 14,715
  2. 2025Qwen3 Technical Reportcited by 8,820
  3. 2022ReAct: Synergizing Reasoning and Acting in Language Modelscited by 8,695
  4. 2024GPT-4o System Cardcited by 4,588
  5. 2023Toolformer: Language Models Can Teach Themselves to Use Toolscited by 4,182
  6. 2025Gemini 2.5: Pushing the Frontier with Advanced Reasoning, Multimodality, Long Context, and Next Generation Agentic Capabilitiescited by 3,796
  7. 2023ToolLLM: Facilitating Large Language Models to Master 16000+ Real-world APIscited by 1,947
  8. 2021WebGPT: Browser-assisted question-answering with human feedbackcited by 1,745
  9. 2022Ignore Previous Prompt: Attack Techniques For Language Modelscited by 832
  10. 2023Language Agent Tree Search Unifies Reasoning Acting and Planning in Language Modelscited by 574
  11. 2024Sleeper Agents: Training Deceptive LLMs that Persist Through Safety Trainingcited by 529
  12. 2023Large Language Models can Strategically Deceive their Users when Put Under Pressurecited by 146
3 more
  1. 2024Refusal-Trained LLMs Are Easily Jailbroken As Browser Agentscited by 65
  2. 2026AgentLAB: Benchmarking LLM Agents against Long-Horizon Attackscited by 39
  3. 2026Mind the GAP: Text Safety Does Not Transfer to Tool-Call Safety in LLM Agentscited by 3

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  1. 2026Attack Success Rate Is Not a Number: On Measurement Validity in Agentic AI Security Evaluation
  2. 2026Your Agentic LLMs Secretly Encode Indirect Prompt-Injection Exposure in Hidden States
  3. 2026How Vulnerable Are AI Agents to Indirect Prompt Injections? Insights from a Large-Scale Public Competition
  4. 2026Defense Against Indirect Prompt Injection via Tool Result Parsing
  5. 2026ActGuard: Pre-execution Action Auditing against Indirect Prompt Injection in LLM Agents
  6. 2026Passing the Test You Trained On: Re-evaluating Prompt-Injection Detectors for LLM Agents
  7. 2026Your Agent is More Brittle Than You Think: Uncovering Indirect Injection Vulnerabilities in Agentic LLMs
  8. 2025PromptArmor: Simple yet Effective Prompt Injection Defenses