Auto-Policy, not Auto-Skill: Compiled Agent Skills for the Physical World
On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance
Abstract (arXiv)
Self-evolving Skill harnesses (AutoSkills, Hermes Agent) generate more advisory orchestration automatically; their reported gains are efficiency, not safety. This misses the actual gap: a Skill describes how an agent should behave; a Policy decides which behavior is allowed to become an action. Today's format covers the first with markdown and scripts; the second is left to the model. Generating more Skills scales the gap, not the safety, especially when a wrong invocation can unlock a door or move money. Two adjacent attacks are documented: malicious skills compromising cloud software, and jailbroken LLM-controlled robots causing physical harm. Their intersection, malicious agent skills causing physical harm, follows directly but has not been reported. We name this class Borrowed Authority: Skills format gives the receiving agent no typed way to reject an inter-agent permission claim, so a malicious or misused Skill can drive actuation by attaching one. We propose Edge Skillguard, a typed authority layer that lives inside the Skill artifact rather than between tools as workflow engines do, with guards over world state and sensor evidence. On a live edge control-plane testbed, the guards reject 60/60 borrowed-authority requests across five attack variants without blocking benign requests, and the result holds at 5x scale and across hosts over a Tailscale mesh. These results suggest that high-risk Skills should co-package typed invocation policy with procedural knowledge, so that physical actions depend on machine-checkable evidence rather than peer-agent claims.
Key facts. Cited by 1 paper in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 9 of its 19 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 25 Aug 2026.
Builds on
9 of 19 references.
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Other references · 8
- 2023Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injectioncited by 1,339
- 2023LLMind: Orchestrating AI and IoT with LLM for Complex Task Executioncited by 24
- 2023SAGE: Smart home Agent with Grounded Executioncited by 13
- 2025Blueprint First, Model Second: A Framework for Deterministic LLM Workflowcited by 11
- 2026Optimizing Agentic Workflows using Meta-toolscited by 4
- 2026Systems-Level Attack Surface of Edge Agent Deployments on IoTcited by 3
- 2025LLMind 2.0: Distributed IoT Automation with Natural Language M2M Communication and Lightweight LLM Agentscited by 2
- 2026Proactive Rejection and Grounded Execution: A Dual-Stage Intent Analysis Paradigm for Safe and Efficient AIoT Smart Homescited by 1
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Citing papers per year: 2026: 1.
1 paper.
Similar, not cited
Close in wording, no citation either way
- 2026SkillGuard: A Permission-Centric Framework for Agent Skill Security
- 2026Towards a Risk Assessment of Malicious Skill Files in Coding Agents
- 2026SkillHarm: Lifecycle-Aware Skill-Based Attacks via Automated Construction
- 2026SkillSecurer: Detecting and Patching Prompt-Injection Vulnerabilities in AI Agent Skills
- 2026SkillJect: Effectively Automating Skill-Based Prompt Injection for Skill-Enabled Agents
- 2026Can Agents Trust Their Skills? Uncovering Unsafe Chains of Trust in Skill-Based LLM Agents
- 2026CompoSkill: Compositional Skill Chain Attacks from Individually Scanner-Passing LLM Agent Skills
- 2026When Safe Skills Collide: Measuring Compositional Risk in Agent Skill Ecosystems