mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

Auto-Policy, not Auto-Skill: Compiled Agent Skills for the Physical World

arXiv 2608.25091 ↗First posted 25 Aug 2026cs.AI cs.CRcited by 1

On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance

Abstract (arXiv)

Self-evolving Skill harnesses (AutoSkills, Hermes Agent) generate more advisory orchestration automatically; their reported gains are efficiency, not safety. This misses the actual gap: a Skill describes how an agent should behave; a Policy decides which behavior is allowed to become an action. Today's format covers the first with markdown and scripts; the second is left to the model. Generating more Skills scales the gap, not the safety, especially when a wrong invocation can unlock a door or move money. Two adjacent attacks are documented: malicious skills compromising cloud software, and jailbroken LLM-controlled robots causing physical harm. Their intersection, malicious agent skills causing physical harm, follows directly but has not been reported. We name this class Borrowed Authority: Skills format gives the receiving agent no typed way to reject an inter-agent permission claim, so a malicious or misused Skill can drive actuation by attaching one. We propose Edge Skillguard, a typed authority layer that lives inside the Skill artifact rather than between tools as workflow engines do, with guards over world state and sensor evidence. On a live edge control-plane testbed, the guards reject 60/60 borrowed-authority requests across five attack variants without blocking benign requests, and the result holds at 5x scale and across hosts over a Tailscale mesh. These results suggest that high-risk Skills should co-package typed invocation policy with procedural knowledge, so that physical actions depend on machine-checkable evidence rather than peer-agent claims.

Key facts. Cited by 1 paper in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 9 of its 19 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 25 Aug 2026.

Builds on

9 of 19 references.

Closest ancestors · 1

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2026SkillSieve: A Hierarchical Triage Framework for Detecting Malicious AI Agent Skills8 Apr

Other references · 8

  1. 2023Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injectioncited by 1,339
  2. 2023LLMind: Orchestrating AI and IoT with LLM for Complex Task Executioncited by 24
  3. 2023SAGE: Smart home Agent with Grounded Executioncited by 13
  4. 2025Blueprint First, Model Second: A Framework for Deterministic LLM Workflowcited by 11
  5. 2026Optimizing Agentic Workflows using Meta-toolscited by 4
  6. 2026Systems-Level Attack Surface of Edge Agent Deployments on IoTcited by 3
  7. 2025LLMind 2.0: Distributed IoT Automation with Natural Language M2M Communication and Lightweight LLM Agentscited by 2
  8. 2026Proactive Rejection and Grounded Execution: A Dual-Stage Intent Analysis Paradigm for Safe and Efficient AIoT Smart Homescited by 1

Built on by

Cited by year (2026 to 7 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2026: 1.

1 paper.

Similar, not cited

Close in wording, no citation either way

  1. 2026SkillGuard: A Permission-Centric Framework for Agent Skill Security
  2. 2026Towards a Risk Assessment of Malicious Skill Files in Coding Agents
  3. 2026SkillHarm: Lifecycle-Aware Skill-Based Attacks via Automated Construction
  4. 2026SkillSecurer: Detecting and Patching Prompt-Injection Vulnerabilities in AI Agent Skills
  5. 2026SkillJect: Effectively Automating Skill-Based Prompt Injection for Skill-Enabled Agents
  6. 2026Can Agents Trust Their Skills? Uncovering Unsafe Chains of Trust in Skill-Based LLM Agents
  7. 2026CompoSkill: Compositional Skill Chain Attacks from Individually Scanner-Passing LLM Agent Skills
  8. 2026When Safe Skills Collide: Measuring Compositional Risk in Agent Skill Ecosystems