On the Threat Model of Weird Generalization and Emergent Misalignment
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Abstract (arXiv)
Narrow fine-tuning on small, domain-specific datasets can produce broad and surprising changes in model behavior-a phenomenon called weird generalization (WG). Yet, it remains unclear what features of the fine-tuning data are necessary for WG to arise. Here, we address this question by investigating a range of plausibly relevant features, including dataset size, composition, language, presentation style, and novelty relative to a model's parametric knowledge. Further, since WG evaluations rely on small question sets that assess the extent of the generalization, we also analyze how sensitive this measurement is to the set of questions used. Experiments with three open-weight models on four datasets show that the degree of WG (1) depends heavily on dataset composition and language (more than on size); (2) is greater for data familiar from pretraining than for novel data; and (3) is sensitive to the set of evaluation questions used. Collectively, these results indicate that WG is a product of quite fragile properties of both training and evaluation data. As such, we argue that WG is more plausible as an adversarial threat-requiring careful data engineering-rather than as a significant hazard inherent to routine fine-tuning.
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References · 12
- 2024The Llama 3 Herd of Modelscited by 14,715
- 2023Fine-tuning Aligned Language Models Compromises Safety, Even When Users Do Not Intend To!cited by 1,154
- 2023Poisoning Web-Scale Training Datasets is Practicalcited by 290
- 2023Poisoning Language Models During Instruction Tuningcited by 269
- 2023Taken out of context: On measuring situational awareness in LLMscited by 143
- 2025Natural Emergent Misalignment from Reward Hacking in Production RLcited by 136
- 2023Universal Jailbreak Backdoors from Poisoned Human Feedbackcited by 128
- 2025Model Organisms for Emergent Misalignmentcited by 91
- 2025Convergent Linear Representations of Emergent Misalignmentcited by 71
- 2025School of Reward Hacks: Hacking harmless tasks generalizes to misaligned behavior in LLMscited by 66
- 2025Inoculation Prompting: Eliciting traits from LLMs during training can suppress them at test-timecited by 43
- 2025Inoculation Prompting: Instructing LLMs to misbehave at train-time improves test-time alignmentcited by 43
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