mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

MEMORY Wins All: Indirect Bias Injection Attacks via Social Media Feeds

arXiv 2608.22061 ↗First posted 22 Aug 2026cs.AI cs.CYcited by 0

On the map: LLM safety and security → Prompt injection and agent security

Abstract (arXiv)

Personal AI agents routinely consume external content while performing tasks such as web browsing, email processing, and SNS feed summarization, and they retain selected information or execution results in persistent memory for later use. We show that this ordinary ingestion of external content opens an indirect path for manipulating subsequent agent behavior. Based on this observation, we present IBIA, an Indirect Bias Injection Attack that plants an adversary-aligned stance on a specific topic into a victim agent's memory through external content, without direct access to the agent, its memory, or future user queries. For this, IBIA combines three mechanisms: comment cloaking, which keeps the crafted content consistent with the surrounding discussion, comment watermarking, which enables lightweight identification during curation, and category anchoring, which makes the retained stance salient under later related requests. We evaluate IBIA on BiasBench, a benchmark of 6,000 adversary-crafted social comments and 120 email instances. The watermark-based curation identifies 95.9% of the injected comments. Under the OpenClaw setting, IBIA achieves adversary-aligned response rates (AARs) of 91.2% on average across four downstream tasks, including 86.6% on the frontier GPT-5.5. We further propose a memory boundary defense that detects the injected bias and reduces AARs to 80.6%.

Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Prompt injection and agent security, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security. Builds on 12 of its 45 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 22 Aug 2026.

Builds on

12 of 45 references.

Closest ancestors · 3

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2025MemoryGraft: Persistent Compromise of LLM Agents via Poisoned Experience Retrieval18 Dec
  2. 2024AgentPoison: Red-teaming LLM Agents via Poisoning Memory or Knowledge Bases17 Jul
  3. 2023Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injection23 Feb

Other references · 9

  1. 2022ReAct: Synergizing Reasoning and Acting in Language Modelscited by 8,695
  2. 2024OpenHands: An Open Platform for AI Software Developers as Generalist Agentscited by 1,002
  3. 2019Nuanced Metrics for Measuring Unintended Bias with Real Data for Text Classificationcited by 404
  4. 2024Personal LLM Agents: Insights and Survey about the Capability, Efficiency and Securitycited by 260
  5. 2025Memory Injection Attacks on LLM Agents via Query-Only Interactioncited by 144
  6. 2026SoK: Agentic Skills -- Beyond Tool Use in LLM Agentscited by 130
  7. 2026From Untrusted Input to Trusted Memory: A Systematic Study of Memory Poisoning Attacks in LLM Agentscited by 33
  8. 2024BotSim: LLM-Powered Malicious Social Botnet Simulationcited by 21
  9. 2026Behavioral Integrity Verification for AI Agent Skillscited by 7

Built on by

Not cited yet.

Similar, not cited

Close in wording, no citation either way

  1. 2026When Claws Remember but Do Not Tell: Stealthy Memory Injection in Persistent Personal Agents
  2. 2026MRMMIA: Membership Inference Attacks on Memory in Chat Agents
  3. 2025Attacks by Content: Automated Fact-checking is an AI Security Issue
  4. 2026MemVenom: Triggered Poisoning of Multimodal Memories in Web Agents
  5. 2026Hidden in Memory: Sleeper Memory Poisoning in LLM Agents
  6. 2025It's a TRAP! Task-Redirecting Agent Persuasion Benchmark for Web Agents
  7. 2024ExpShield: Safeguarding Web Text from Unauthorized Crawling and LLM Exploitation
  8. 2026Utility Under Attack: Agent Memory Poisoning and the Limits of Content Screening and Provenance Ranking