Runtime Action Interference for AI Control of AlphaStar in StarCraft II
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Abstract (arXiv)
A trained reinforcement learning policy does not determine the complete behavior that users encounter: deployment code still schedules, admits, suppresses, or replaces its proposed actions. We contribute runtime action interference (RAI), an AI control mechanism that preserves policy parameters while regulating action pacing and filtering configured action patterns after inference. RAI releases a proposed action only when its cooldown condition is satisfied and its content detector does not flag the action; otherwise, it dispatches a no-op. The detector covers specified toxic behaviors, including worker-unit harassment, while the cooldown controls action rate. We implement RAI in a replication of AlphaStar actor.py and make the implementation and reproducibility materials available through an open source code repository. We deployed RAI in a textitStarCraft~II human participant study that compared two presentations of the same opponent with high capability and rate limited actions; we withheld its capability claim in one presentation and disclosed it in the other. On response scales from 1 to 5, we observed pooled fairness, trust, and toxicity means of 3.90, 3.50, and 2.00 under claim withholding, compared with 2.62, 4.31, and 2.85 under disclosure. Disclosure corresponded with lower perceived fairness and higher perceived toxicity across every expertise group, whereas trust increased among novices and experts but decreased among intermediate participants. Our human evaluation therefore shows that perceptions of an opponent controlled through RAI can vary substantially with the capability information presented to users, even when the configured control remains constant. We conclude that human-computer evaluations must separate control within the execution stack from capability disclosure and assess fairness, trust, and toxicity as distinct dimensions of human experience.
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References · 14
- 2017Constrained Policy Optimizationcited by 928
- 2017Safe Reinforcement Learning via Shieldingcited by 427
- 2020Does the Whole Exceed its Parts? The Effect of AI Explanations on Complementary Team Performancecited by 396
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- 2025AgentSpec: Customizable Runtime Enforcement for Safe and Reliable LLM Agentscited by 196
- 2020Aligning Superhuman AI with Human Behavior: Chess as a Model Systemcited by 78
- 2024'Simulacrum of Stories': Examining Large Language Models as Qualitative Research Participantscited by 27
- 2024To Rely or Not to Rely? Evaluating Interventions for Appropriate Reliance on Large Language Modelscited by 17
- 2026Reinforced Agent: Inference-Time Feedback for Tool-Calling Agentscited by 6
- 2019Leveling the Playing Field -- Fairness in AI Versus Human Game Benchmarkscited by 4
- 2025Creating and Evaluating Personas Using Generative AI: A Scoping Review of 81 Articlescited by 4
- 2026More Human or More AI? Visualizing Human-AI Collaboration Disclosures in Journalistic News Productioncited by 3
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