Persistent Semantic Entities in Tool-Augmented LLM Systems
On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent memory systems
Abstract (arXiv)
Tool-augmented LLM agents can harbor implicit state that persists across sessions, activates through events, and propagates across agent boundaries---largely invisible to standard debugging. We formalize this as Persistent Semantic Entities (PSEs): constructs defined by name binding, event triggering, and cross-boundary propagation, and evaluate them across 24 models from 11 families (1.5B--1T parameters). First, every tested model is susceptible (20--100% on the 20-model susceptibility panel), with name binding as the necessary and dominant mechanism: without it, contamination is 0%. Second, persistence depends on contamination type rather than scale or deployment: preference contamination persists undecayed on every model probed (100% at t=10) and instruction contamination persists wherever adopted, persona-style injection decays partially (90%→10%), while factual injection is model-dependent---self-corrected on Llama-3.1-8B and GPT-4o-mini but held at ceiling on both Qwen2.5-coder variants, so we do not claim it self-corrects in general. The preference and instruction results hold across providers in our controlled setting. Third, context-isolated self-verification achieves 20--79% reduction (median 36.5%) without oracle references while keyword-based detection produces systematic false positives, and contamination compounds 1.9× along a four-stage agent pipeline (40%→75%). Preference and instruction contamination---persistent, lacking self-correction, and poorly captured by standard monitoring---represent a particularly concerning attack surface for deployed agent systems.
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent memory systems, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 23 of its 36 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 8 Aug 2026.
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23 of 36 references.
References · 23
- 2022ReAct: Synergizing Reasoning and Acting in Language Modelscited by 8,355
- 2023Toolformer: Language Models Can Teach Themselves to Use Toolscited by 4,072
- 2022Constitutional AI: Harmlessness from AI Feedbackcited by 2,950
- 2023AutoGen: Enabling Next-Gen LLM Applications via Multi-Agent Conversationcited by 1,906
- 2023ToolLLM: Facilitating Large Language Models to Master 16000+ Real-world APIscited by 1,880
- 2023MetaGPT: Meta Programming for A Multi-Agent Collaborative Frameworkcited by 1,761
- 2023Jailbroken: How Does LLM Safety Training Fail?cited by 1,565
- 2023Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injectioncited by 1,339
- 2023Gorilla: Large Language Model Connected with Massive APIscited by 1,302
- 2023MemGPT: Towards LLMs as Operating Systemscited by 1,295
- 2023Teaching Large Language Models to Self-Debugcited by 963
- 2024The Instruction Hierarchy: Training LLMs to Prioritize Privileged Instructionscited by 441
11 more
- 2024AgentPoison: Red-teaming LLM Agents via Poisoning Memory or Knowledge Basescited by 402
- 2024Agent Security Bench (ASB): Formalizing and Benchmarking Attacks and Defenses in LLM-based Agentscited by 341
- 2024PoisonedRAG: Knowledge Corruption Attacks to Retrieval-Augmented Generation of Large Language Modelscited by 251
- 2023Poisoning Retrieval Corpora by Injecting Adversarial Passagescited by 153
- 2025Memory Injection Attacks on LLM Agents via Query-Only Interactioncited by 127
- 2025MCPTox: A Benchmark for Tool Poisoning Attack on Real-World MCP Serverscited by 63
- 2026Memory Poisoning Attack and Defense on Memory Based LLM-Agentscited by 40
- 2026AgentSentry: Mitigating Indirect Prompt Injection in LLM Agents via Temporal Causal Diagnostics and Context Purificationcited by 28
- 2024When LLMs Play the Telephone Game: Cultural Attractors as Conceptual Tools to Evaluate LLMs in Multi-turn Settingscited by 17
- 2025Unveiling Attractor Cycles in Large Language Models: A Dynamical Systems View of Successive Paraphrasingcited by 14
- 2025MindGuard: Intrinsic Decision Inspection for Securing LLM Agents Against Metadata Poisoningcited by 10
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