Revealed Rationality: Label-Free Evaluation and Regularization from Representation Theorems
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Abstract (arXiv)
Representation theorems in decision theory establish that behavior satisfies certain axioms if and only if it can be rationalized by a well-defined objective. I argue that this ``if and only if'' structure provides a potentially useful foundation for label-free evaluation and regularization of LLMs and other AI systems. Axiom compliance can be checked from the model's own responses to synthetic choice problems, with no external labels or human feedback, and the penalties are readily computable. Because the axioms are necessary and sufficient, the resulting checks exhaust the implications of the relevant rationality standard for the elicited data: a model that passes cannot be rejected on rationality grounds by any further test of the same data. I discuss three instantiations: probabilistic coherence via a theorem of de Finetti, preference rationality via Afriat's theorem, and subjective expected utility via a theorem of Echenique and Saito (2015), each yielding a continuous penalty that is zero whenever behavior can be rationalized. Since coherence does not restrict which objective rationalizes behavior, these penalties complement rather than replace other evaluation and training signals.
Key facts. Cited by 3 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 22 of its 48 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 5 Aug 2026.
Builds on
22 of 48 references.
References · 22
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10 more
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Citing papers per year: 2026: 3.
3 papers.