Commitment To Cooperation With Self-Negotiated Contracts
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Abstract (arXiv)
As AI agents operate with increasing autonomy in a multi-agent world, they will need to learn to cooperate with other agents and with humans to generate mutual benefits. However, cooperation is a challenge because the costs of cooperation are often incurred early on, but the benefits are only realized later, creating an incentive to defect. How can AI agents cooperate with commitment? Here, we draw on inspiration from legal institutions and contracting that human societies have used to solve principal-agent problems of this kind. Contracts provide observable representations of agreements that enable credible commitments through the enforcement of terms. We study the role of contract-based cooperation using LLM-based agents in CT, a spatial-temporal game that combines bargaining with navigation towards a goal. We study a suite of contract representations that range from formal contracts that compile to code to natural contracts that require reinterpretation. We evaluate agents with a range of LLM backbones using different sizes and providers. We find that self-negotiated contracts can improve cooperative outcomes beyond what is possible with regular trading.
Key facts. Cited by 1 paper in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 11 of its 41 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 23 Jul 2026.
Builds on
11 of 41 references.
References · 11
- 2025Qwen3 Technical Reportcited by 8,820
- 2025Multi-Agent Risks from Advanced AIcited by 163
- 2018Decoupling Strategy and Generation in Negotiation Dialoguescited by 162
- 2024Cooperate or Collapse: Emergence of Sustainable Cooperation in a Society of LLM Agentscited by 125
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Citing papers per year: 2026: 1.
1 paper.
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- 2025The Automated but Risky Game: Modeling and Benchmarking Agent-to-Agent Negotiations and Transactions in Consumer Markets
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