Privacy Cost as Equity Input: A Group Fairness Criterion for Differentially Private Machine Learning
On the map: LLM safety and security → Membership inference attacks
Abstract (arXiv)
Differential privacy (DP) is increasingly deployed to limit membership inference risk in machine-learning systems. Prior work has shown that DP-SGD can widen accuracy disparities across demographic groups, but this framing treats fairness as a purely outcome-side concern. We argue that privacy cost, the information leakage borne by each group, is itself a form of harm, and adopt a compensatory-fairness framework in which a group that involuntarily bears greater privacy exposure is owed proportionally greater benefit from the system. From this principle we derive the Privacy-Cost Equity Ratio (PCER), a group fairness metric defined as a group's positive prediction rate normalized by its per-group overfitting gap. By a standard membership inference bound, this overfitting gap upper-bounds each group's vulnerability to inference attacks, making PCER a conservative measure of benefit relative to exposure. PCER needs only per-group train and test accuracy (no shadow models), making it a practical post-hoc audit tool. We evaluate PCER alongside standard fairness metrics across six benchmark--attribute combinations spanning tabular and NLP domains, under DP-SGD at a range of privacy budgets, and validate the overfitting-gap proxy against a direct threshold membership-inference attack. The results reveal patterns that outcome-based metrics miss. On COMPAS, PCER uncovers a persistent double disadvantage: the protected group bears both greater privacy exposure and worse predictive outcomes, something demographic parity gap masks entirely. Sensitivity analysis shows very strong privacy guarantees collapse both groups' overfitting to a numerical floor, rendering exposure-based audits uninformative in that regime. Together, these findings show that fairness audits of privacy-preserving systems must account for who bears the cost of protection, not only who benefits from its outcomes.
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Membership inference attacks, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security. Builds on 14 of its 23 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 18 Jul 2026.
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- 2016Membership Inference Attacks against Machine Learning Modelscited by 2,221
- 2021Retiring Adult: New Datasets for Fair Machine Learningcited by 443
- 2016Semi-supervised Knowledge Transfer for Deep Learning from Private Training Datacited by 347
- 2019Bias in Bios: A Case Study of Semantic Representation Bias in a High-Stakes Settingcited by 346
- 2019Differential Privacy Has Disparate Impact on Model Accuracycited by 316
- 2017Fairness in Machine Learning: Lessons from Political Philosophycited by 148
- 2018A Unified Approach to Quantifying Algorithmic Unfairness: Measuring Individual & Group Unfairness via Inequality Indicescited by 97
- 2020On the Privacy Risks of Algorithmic Fairnesscited by 82
- 2018Differentially Private Fair Learningcited by 76
- 2020Differentially Private and Fair Deep Learning: A Lagrangian Dual Approachcited by 53
- 2019What's in a Name? Reducing Bias in Bios without Access to Protected Attributescited by 51
- 2019Disparate Vulnerability to Membership Inference Attackscited by 33
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