mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

Necessary but Not Sufficient: Temperature Control and Reproducibility in LLM-as-Judge Safety Evaluations

arXiv 2606.26185 ↗First posted 24 Jun 2026cs.LGcited by 1

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Abstract (arXiv)

LLM-as-judge ("grader") components are now standard in evaluation harnesses, including safety evaluations where a pass/fail verdict may gate downstream deployment decisions. A widespread assumption is that setting the grader's sampling temperature to 0 makes grading deterministic. We test this assumption against a real safety-evaluation codebase (Japan AISI's open-source aisev) and show it fails on two levels. First, the harness invokes its grader without setting temperature or seed; the underlying provider silently applies its default of 1.0, so items near the decision boundary flip pass/fail across identical runs (per-item disagreement up to ~50% over 20 runs). Second, pinning temperature=0 reduces but does not eliminate flips: across 690 API calls spanning two providers, three model tiers, and five sampling configurations, 1-2 of 7 borderline items remain non-reproducible even under forced greedy decoding (top_k=1). Claude Opus 4.7/4.8 has since deprecated temperature entirely, rendering the primary mitigation inapplicable to newer model generations. These findings expose a structural gap: evaluation harnesses that report single-run verdicts without variance or grader-disagreement metrics can present noise as a safety property. We release a reproduction harness (690 calls, 7 conditions) and recommend that harnesses treat grader disagreement as a first-class health metric alongside the scores themselves.

Key facts. Cited by 1 paper in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 5 of its 11 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 24 Jun 2026.

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5 of 11 references.

References · 5

  1. 2023Judging LLM-as-a-Judge with MT-Bench and Chatbot Arenacited by 8,626
  2. 2023Large Language Models are not Fair Evaluatorscited by 1,085
  3. 2024Large Language Models are Inconsistent and Biased Evaluatorscited by 153
  4. 2024Who Validates the Validators? Aligning LLM-Assisted Evaluation of LLM Outputs with Human Preferencescited by 144
  5. 2026Your Agent Is Mine: Measuring Malicious Intermediary Attacks on the LLM Supply Chaincited by 13

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