mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

PARSE: Provenance-Aware Retrieval Sanitization for Professional Domain LLM Agents

arXiv 2606.17467 ↗First posted 16 Jun 2026cs.CR cs.CLcited by 0

On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance

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Abstract (arXiv)

Prompt injection defenses evaluated on synthetic benchmarks do not generalize to real enterprise documents, which are longer, denser, and interleave legitimate authority language with factual content. We demonstrate this gap with a benchmark of 122 tasks across five professional domains (financial, legal, medical, scientific, DevOps) built on real retrieved documents -- actual SEC filings, Federal Register rules, PubMed abstracts, arXiv papers, and GitHub postmortems -- paired with LLM-generated tasks and camouflaged payloads that were not human-validated. Paraphrasing, the strongest defense on synthetic benchmarks, shows no statistically significant attack success rate reduction on real documents (p=0.500) while degrading utility from 91.8% to 82.8%. We introduce PARSE (Provenance-Aware Retrieval Sanitization), a domain-aware, fact-preserving sanitization pipeline that classifies each sentence by injection likelihood, extracts structured facts before rewriting, and verifies fact preservation via a consistency-checking loop. A directiveness gate routes 59% of real enterprise documents to a lightweight path, concentrating computational cost on high-risk documents. PARSE achieves 15.6% attack success rate -- a 39% reduction versus the 25.4% baseline -- at 86.9% utility, the largest reduction of any condition evaluated (h=-0.245), nominally significant (p=0.014) but not surviving correction for multiple comparisons. Practitioners should evaluate defenses on domain-matched real documents, not synthetic proxies.

Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 7 of its 14 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 16 Jun 2026.

Builds on

7 of 14 references.

Closest ancestors · 2

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2026Blind Spots in the Guard: How Domain-Camouflaged Injection Attacks Evade Detection in Multi-Agent LLM Systems21 May
  2. 2025CommandSans: Securing AI Agents with Surgical Precision Prompt Sanitization9 Oct

Other references · 5

  1. 2023Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injectioncited by 1,443
  2. 2023Llama Guard: LLM-based Input-Output Safeguard for Human-AI Conversationscited by 1,207
  3. 2022Ignore Previous Prompt: Attack Techniques For Language Modelscited by 832
  4. 2023Baseline Defenses for Adversarial Attacks Against Aligned Language Modelscited by 651
  5. 2024Defending Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks With Spotlightingcited by 267

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  1. 2026Utility Under Attack: Agent Memory Poisoning and the Limits of Content Screening and Provenance Ranking
  2. 2026ProvenanceGuard: Source-Aware Factuality Verification for MCP-Based LLM Agents
  3. 2026PACE: Provenance-Aware Capability Enforcement for Tool-Using LLM Agents
  4. 2026TRIS: A Tri-Layer Retrieval Integrity Sieve Against Knowledge Poisoning
  5. 2026Origin Is All You Need: Provenance-Aware Transformers for Structural Trust-Boundary Separation
  6. 2026EvidenT: Building Trustworthy Enterprise Assistants through Evidence Groundedness and Traceability
  7. 2026Auditing Data Provenance in LLM Fine-tuning via Intrinsic Distributional Fingerprints
  8. 2026Combating Knowledge Corruption in Agent Systems: A Byzantine-Tolerant Secure Collaborative RAG Framework