A Low-Rank Subspace Analysis of LLM Interventions
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Abstract (arXiv)
Interventions designed to modify a particular behavior in LLMs, such as refusal or sycophancy, often produce unintended changes in other behaviors. This lack of targeted control makes it difficult to design and implement reliable safety controls. To understand these side-effects, we introduce a diagnostic framework for analyzing interacting behaviors in LLMs. We model behaviors as low-rank subspaces in activation space, and study how interventions influence across behaviors. Across multiple instruction-tuned models (7B-70B) and across refusal, jailbreak, and sycophancy settings, we find that different behaviors share internal representations, and intervening on one behavior alters others in asymmetric ways. Some behaviors act as upstream control points whose interventions propagate broadly across other behaviors, while others remain more isolated. We relate these effects to two geometric quantities: (i) the overlap between behavior subspaces, measured as the average squared cosine of principal angles, and (ii) the angle between each behavior subspace and the decision subspace (capturing the model's final decision e.g., refuse vs. comply). Empirically, intervention effects on other behaviors tend to be larger for behavior pairs with higher subspace overlap, and for source behaviors whose subspaces lie closer (smaller angle) to the decision subspace. These findings highlight a challenge for targeted behavior control: behaviors are difficult to modify independently, as interventions can propagate through shared representations and asymmetric interactions.
Key facts. Cited by 3 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 22 of its 27 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 12 Jun 2026.
Builds on
22 of 27 references.
References · 22
- 2023Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Modelscited by 3,104
- 2022Locating and Editing Factual Associations in GPTcited by 2,691
- 2019Similarity of Neural Network Representations Revisitedcited by 1,755
- 2024HarmBench: A Standardized Evaluation Framework for Automated Red Teaming and Robust Refusalcited by 1,429
- 2023Inference-Time Intervention: Eliciting Truthful Answers from a Language Modelcited by 1,302
- 2022Interpretability in the Wild: a Circuit for Indirect Object Identification in GPT-2 smallcited by 1,165
- 2022Editing Models with Task Arithmeticcited by 1,120
- 2023Steering Llama 2 via Contrastive Activation Additioncited by 1,085
- 2024Refusal in Language Models Is Mediated by a Single Directioncited by 1,032
- 2022Toy Models of Superpositioncited by 971
- 2023Steering Language Models With Activation Engineeringcited by 922
- 2023The Linear Representation Hypothesis and the Geometry of Large Language Modelscited by 716
10 more
- 2023The Geometry of Truth: Emergent Linear Structure in Large Language Model Representations of True/False Datasetscited by 712
- 2023Catastrophic Jailbreak of Open-source LLMs via Exploiting Generationcited by 451
- 2025Emergent Misalignment: Narrow finetuning can produce broadly misaligned LLMscited by 172
- 2024Analyzing the Generalization and Reliability of Steering Vectorscited by 143
- 2025LLMs Encode Harmfulness and Refusal Separatelycited by 88
- 2025Understanding (Un)Reliability of Steering Vectors in Language Modelscited by 47
- 2024Beyond Single Concept Vector: Modeling Concept Subspace in LLMs with Gaussian Distributioncited by 27
- 2024Comparing Bottom-Up and Top-Down Steering Approaches on In-Context Learning Taskscited by 14
- 2025From Dormant to Deleted: Tamper-Resistant Unlearning Through Weight-Space Regularizationcited by 12
- 2025Safety Subspaces are Not Linearly Distinct: A Fine-Tuning Case Studycited by 6
Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2026: 3.
3 papers.
- 2026Forecasting Side Effects of Activation Steeringcited by 2
- 2026Activation-Space Order-Swap Geometry: A Site-Asymmetry Auditcited by 0
- 2026Contrastive Covariance Subspaces for Activation Steeringcited by 0
- 2026Contrastive Covariance Subspaces for Activation Steering29 Sep 2026
- 2026Activation-Space Order-Swap Geometry: A Site-Asymmetry Audit26 Aug 2026
- 2026Forecasting Side Effects of Activation Steering28 Jul 2026
Similar, not cited
Close in wording, no citation either way
- 2026Representational Control over Self-Report & Behavior Coherence in LLM Risk-Taking
- 2026Don't Judge an LLM Only by Its Activations: Discovering Suppressed Safety Features via Counterfactual Activation Potential
- 2024Towards Reliable Evaluation of Behavior Steering Interventions in LLMs
- 2026On the Steering Dimensionality of Refusal in Language Models
- 2024Programming Refusal with Conditional Activation Steering
- 2026The Refusal--Compliance Tradeoff: A Large-Scale Safety Behavior Audit of Large Language Models
- 2026Rethinking Psychometric Evaluation of LLMs: When and Why Self-Reports Predict Behavior
- 2026Do LLMs Follow Their Own Rules? A Reflexive Audit of Self-Stated Safety Policies