mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

Categorical Robustness Assessment for Machine Learning based Network Intrusion Detection Systems

arXiv 2606.12075 ↗First posted 10 Jun 2026cs.CR cs.LGcited by 0

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Abstract (arXiv)

Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) heavily utlize Machine Learning (ML) but ML models can be manipulated via adversarial attacks. These attacks add carefully crafted perturbations to network traffic data that leads to misclassifications. While prior work has demonstrated adversarial vulnerabilities in isolated settings, systematic cross-architecture as well as class and category of attack based comparisons under controlled attack conditions remain limited, leaving practitioners without clear guidance on which models to deploy in adversarial environments. This paper asks a simple question: what type of classifier architectures actually hold up when attackers try to manipulate the systems? We put three popular architectures through their paces: a 1D Convolutional Neural Network, a Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) network, and a Random Forest (RF) ensemble. Using the ACI-IoT-2023 dataset (over 1.2 million samples spanning 12 attack types), we subject each model with FGSM and PGD adversarial attacks, which apply gradient-based perturbations in normalized feature space consistent with established adversarial ML evaluation protocols, at perturbation budgets ranging from ε=0.01 to ε=0.1. Surprisingly, Random Forest achieved near-perfect baseline accuracy (99.98%), yet collapsed catastrophically under attack, dropping 73 percentage points at the smallest perturbation we tested. CNN, on the other hand, retained 95.5% accuracy at ε=0.01 and degraded gracefully as perturbations increased. LSTM fell somewhere in between. These findings flip the conventional wisdom where high baseline accuracy means nothing if a model shatters at the first sign of adversarial pressure. For practitioners deploying intrusion detection in adversarial environments, we recommend CNN-based architectures and provide scenario-specific deployment guidance.

Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 12 of its 27 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 10 Jun 2026.

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References · 12

  1. 2014Explaining and Harnessing Adversarial Examplescited by 7,364
  2. 2015Batch Normalization: Accelerating Deep Network Training by Reducing Internal Covariate Shiftcited by 7,005
  3. 2017Towards Deep Learning Models Resistant to Adversarial Attackscited by 6,415
  4. 2013Intriguing properties of neural networkscited by 5,155
  5. 2016Towards Evaluating the Robustness of Neural Networkscited by 2,998
  6. 2016Transferability in Machine Learning: from Phenomena to Black-Box Attacks using Adversarial Samplescited by 446
  7. 2018Evaluating the Robustness of Neural Networks: An Extreme Value Theory Approachcited by 182
  8. 2018Kitsune: An Ensemble of Autoencoders for Online Network Intrusion Detectioncited by 121
  9. 2021Modeling Realistic Adversarial Attacks against Network Intrusion Detection Systemscited by 41
  10. 2020Adversarial Machine Learning in Network Intrusion Detection Systemscited by 25
  11. 2018A Novel Hierarchical Intrusion Detection System based on Decision Tree and Rules-based Modelscited by 9
  12. 2019Intriguing Properties of Adversarial ML Attacks in the Problem Space [Extended Version]cited by 7

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