Covert Influence Between Language Models
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Abstract (arXiv)
As language models increasingly consume one another's outputs, covert influence -- a phenomenon where a sender's payload (the behavioral disposition it is conditioned to propagate) transfers to a receiver through carriers undetectable by humans -- becomes a growing risk. We characterize this risk across three interfaces: supervised fine-tuning, on-policy distillation, and in-context learning, and find that they vary in the scale of influence achievable without leaving behind human-visible traces. Using inference-time per-sample attribution scores, we study covert influence across all three interfaces with the ability to select carriers that amplify training-time influence, unlocking payload transfers that prior work could not achieve. We further provide evidence that covert influence with natural-language carriers is a distinct phenomenon from prior studies using number carriers, as the latter is more resistant to human detection and less portable across model families. Together, these results suggest that the risk surface for covert influence is broader than previously recognized, and we study pointwise attribution scoring methods as a tool to investigate and mitigate it.
Key facts. Cited by 4 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 17 of its 23 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 2 Jun 2026.
Builds on
17 of 23 references.
References · 17
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- 2024Tulu 3: Pushing Frontiers in Open Language Model Post-Trainingcited by 988
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5 more
- 2025Emergent Misalignment via In-Context Learning: Narrow in-context examples can produce broadly misaligned LLMscited by 17
- 2026Subliminal Effects in Your Data: A General Mechanism via Log-Linearitycited by 15
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Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2026: 4.
4 papers.
- 2026Despite Instructions: Frontier Agents Improvise Covert Channels at Test Timecited by 1
- 2026Subliminal Learning as Trait-Direction Drift: A Mechanism and Targeted Control under SFT Distillationcited by 0
- 2026Towards Identifying the Dataset Biases Causing Phantom Transfercited by 0
- 2026Beyond Owls: Subliminal Learning Can Transfer Learned Capabilities and Backdoorscited by 0
- 2026Beyond Owls: Subliminal Learning Can Transfer Learned Capabilities and Backdoors7 Oct 2026
- 2026Despite Instructions: Frontier Agents Improvise Covert Channels at Test Time26 Sep 2026
- 2026Towards Identifying the Dataset Biases Causing Phantom Transfer13 Sep 2026
- 2026Subliminal Learning as Trait-Direction Drift: A Mechanism and Targeted Control under SFT Distillation1 Sep 2026