Token Budgets: An Empirical Catalog of 63 LLM-Agent Budget-Overrun Incidents, with an Affine-Typed Rust Mitigation as a Case Study
On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Software engineering coding agents
Abstract (arXiv)
LLM-agent budget overruns are a documented production failure class: a single retry loop can spend thousands of dollars before an operator notices, and the in-process integrity properties that would prevent it (no aliasing, no double-spend, no use-after-delegation of a cost-bearing value) are enforced, if at all, by ad-hoc wrappers rather than by the type system. Our central contribution is empirical: a catalog of 63 confirmed production incidents from 21 orchestration frameworks (2023-2026), each backed by a quoted GitHub issue and, where reported, a dollar loss, organized into an eight-cluster failure taxonomy (inter-rater Cohen's kappa = 0.837, N = 113), plus 47 supplementary structural entries. As one mitigation evaluated against this taxonomy, we build token-budgets, an 1,180-line Rust crate (no unsafe) that operationalizes affine ownership so that cloning, double-spending, or using a budget after delegating it are compile errors rather than runtime hazards an operator must remember to avoid. The dollar cap is runtime arithmetic under an estimator assumption; the affine layer makes that arithmetic non-bypassable. On single-agent workloads a 4-line Python counter matches the crate at 0/30 overshoot, so the distinguishing value is non-bypassability under operator error in multi-agent delegation: the delegation-fanout race documented in 11 incidents is rejected by the borrow checker at compile time, while the same pattern under asyncio overshoots 30/30 and three disciplined alternatives overshoot 0/30. Across five runtimes, three providers, and a temperature-stratified live-API test (N = 160), the approach reports zero cap violations and zero false refusals, at operational parity with concurrent work. Static over-reservation is 4-6x (2.11x adaptive). Binary-level cap-soundness on the running binary is left open.
Key facts. Cited by 4 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Software engineering coding agents, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 16 of its 89 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 2 Jun 2026.
Builds on
16 of 89 references.
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Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2026: 4.
4 papers.
- 2026Engineering Reliable Coding Agents: Evaluating and Operating the System Around the Modelcited by 1
- 2026Spawn Freely, Act Sparingly: Progressive Risk Vesting for Recursive LLM-Agent Treescited by 1
- 2026Persistent Billable State: Denial-of-Wallet Attacks and Defenses in Tool-Calling LLM Agentscited by 0
- 2026Authorization for Self-Modifying AI Agent Populations: Conserving Authority across Replacement, Forking, and Rollbackcited by 0
- 2026Authorization for Self-Modifying AI Agent Populations: Conserving Authority across Replacement, Forking, and Rollback29 Sep 2026
- 2026Persistent Billable State: Denial-of-Wallet Attacks and Defenses in Tool-Calling LLM Agents23 Sep 2026
- 2026Spawn Freely, Act Sparingly: Progressive Risk Vesting for Recursive LLM-Agent Trees1 Sep 2026
- 2026Engineering Reliable Coding Agents: Evaluating and Operating the System Around the Model14 Aug 2026
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- 2026When to Compile a Computer-Use Agent? Measuring Payback and Making Compilation Decisions for Token Efficiency