CANARY: Zero-Label Detection of Fine-Tuning Contamination in Language Models
On the map: Mechanistic interpretability → Steering and probing for LLM safety
Abstract (arXiv)
Adversaries can implant latent harmful behavior by poisoning as few as 1% of fine-tuning examples. The contamination is invisible to every output-level defense: harmful behavior lies dormant in the model's hidden-state geometry and does not appear in generated text until contamination exceeds 7.5%. We introduce CANARY (Contamination Auditor via Neural Activation Representation Yield), a zero-label checkpoint auditor that detects this hidden shift directly from two forward passes over an unlabeled prompt set. CANARY projects the hidden-state difference through a Sparse Autoencoder, filtering style noise to isolate meaningful semantic drift. It achieves AUROC = 1.000 at 1% contamination (95% CI = [0.997, 1.000]; Cohen's d = 3.28) across four model architectures and two training paradigms, 7.5x below where any output-level method fires, with zero false positives on benign fine-tuning and full robustness to style-matching and gradient-noise adaptive attacks. The same SAE feature basis drives a complete governance pipeline: SAE-filtered amplification surfaces latent harm at a 5x higher rate than standard generation; score-ranked prompts yield 4.2x red-teaming lift; and suppressing a handful of contamination-specific features at inference time reduces harm from 70% to 10% with no perplexity penalty. CANARY is the first zero-label framework to detect, verify, prioritize, and remediate supply-chain contamination from hidden states alone.
Key facts. Cited by 1 paper in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Steering and probing for LLM safety, one of 13 directions in Mechanistic interpretability. Builds on 16 of its 20 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 1 Jun 2026.
Builds on
16 of 20 references.
References · 16
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4 more
- 2024Sleeper Agents: Training Deceptive LLMs that Persist Through Safety Trainingcited by 529
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Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2026: 1.
1 paper.
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- 2026Where Does Toxicity Live? Mechanistic Localization and Targeted Suppression in Language Models
- 2025Panacea: Mitigating Harmful Fine-tuning for Large Language Models via Post-fine-tuning Perturbation
- 2025In-Training Defenses against Emergent Misalignment in Language Models
- 2026Open-Weight LLM Fine-Tuning Defenses are Susceptible to Simple Attacks
- 2024Turning Generative Models Degenerate: The Power of Data Poisoning Attacks
- 2025Safety Mirage: How Spurious Correlations Undermine VLM Safety Fine-Tuning and Can Be Mitigated by Machine Unlearning