RASET: Router-Agnostic Safety-Critical Expert Tuning Exposes Localized Safety Enforcement Failures in Mixture-of-Experts LLMs
On the map: LLM alignment / RLHF / preference optimisation → Safety alignment and jailbreak attacks
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Abstract (arXiv)
Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) LLMs rely on sparse, router-driven expert activation, yet how safety alignment interacts with routed expert specialization remains underexplored. A common intuition is that safety behavior may be controlled by routing harmful requests to distinct refusal-oriented experts. In this work, we provide empirical evidence for a different picture: routing patterns in aligned MoE LLMs are largely topic-driven, while safety behavior can be altered with little change to the model's intrinsic routing path. Motivated by this observation, we present RASET (Router-Agnostic Safety-Critical Expert Tuning), a red-teaming framework that probes safety enforcement that is localized in a small subset of experts while preserving the model's intrinsic routing behavior. RASET identifies safety-critical experts via a contrastive routing-sensitivity criterion and applies parameter-efficient tuning only to the selected experts, minimizing semantic disruption relative to router-steering interventions. Across five open-weight MoE backbones, RASET achieves high-quality safety-bypass yield (50.5% average ASRhq, +37.6 points over the strongest baseline). These results reveal a distinct MoE safety risk, highlighting the need for expert-aware alignment mechanisms.
Key facts. Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Safety alignment and jailbreak attacks, one of 10 directions in LLM alignment / RLHF / preference optimisation. Builds on 16 of its 37 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 28 May 2026.
Builds on
16 of 37 references.
Closest ancestors · 3
Same direction, newest first
- 2025Circumventing Safety Alignment in Large Language Models Through Embedding Space Toxicity Attenuation8 Jul
- 2024Model-Editing-Based Jailbreak against Safety-aligned Large Language Models11 Dec
- 2023Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Models27 Jul
Other references · 13
- 2025Qwen3 Technical Reportcited by 8,195
- 2021Evaluating Large Language Models Trained on Codecited by 8,053
- 2020Measuring Massive Multitask Language Understandingcited by 7,768
- 2017Outrageously Large Neural Networks: The Sparsely-Gated Mixture-of-Experts Layercited by 3,413
- 2024Phi-3 Technical Report: A Highly Capable Language Model Locally on Your Phonecited by 1,883
- 2024Mixtral of Expertscited by 1,785
- 2020GShard: Scaling Giant Models with Conditional Computation and Automatic Shardingcited by 1,601
- 2025gpt-oss-120b & gpt-oss-20b Model Cardcited by 1,258
- 2024DeepSeek-V2: A Strong, Economical, and Efficient Mixture-of-Experts Language Modelcited by 1,093
- 2024Mixture-of-Depths: Dynamically allocating compute in transformer-based language modelscited by 242
- 2025BadMoE: Backdooring Mixture-of-Experts LLMs via Optimizing Routing Triggers and Infecting Dormant Expertscited by 8
- 2026Beyond Linearization: Attributed Table Graphs for Table Reasoningcited by 4
Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2026: 2.
2 papers.
Similar, not cited
Close in wording, no citation either way
- 2026RASA: Routing-Aware Safety Alignment for Mixture-of-Experts Models
- 2026RouteHijack: Routing-Aware Attack on Mixture-of-Experts LLMs
- 2026Safety-Oriented Routing Analysis of Mixtral MoE Under Benign and Harmful Prompts
- 2025SAFEx: Analyzing Vulnerabilities of MoE-Based LLMs via Stable Safety-critical Expert Identification
- 2026Sparse Models, Sparse Safety: Unsafe Routes in Mixture-of-Experts LLMs
- 2026Misrouter: Exploiting Routing Mechanisms for Input-Only Attacks on Mixture-of-Experts LLMs
- 2026MESA: Improving MoE Safety Alignment via Decentralized Expertise
- 2026Large Language Lobotomy: Jailbreaking Mixture-of-Experts via Expert Silencing