mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

Beyond Attack Success Rate: Temporal Logit Observability for LLM Safety Failures

arXiv 2605.29629 ↗First posted 28 May 2026cs.AIcited by 0

On the map: LLM safety and security → Jailbreaking

Abstract (arXiv)

Attack Success Rate (ASR) evaluates each jailbreak with a single yes/no label at the end of generation, telling us whether a failure happened but not how it unfolded. Two attacks that produce equally harmful outputs may have followed completely different paths, and ASR cannot tell them apart. We make those hidden paths observable from logits alone. Temporal Logit Observability (TLO) is a training-free diagnostic that watches a compliance-refusal margin during decoding and places each model-attack condition on a calibrated 2D plane. By design, this plane is most informative exactly where ASR is least informative: among attacks that succeed for genuinely different reasons. Across four aligned LLMs and three jailbreak paradigms, attacks with nearly identical ASR land at clearly different points on the plane: the same model can fail through different temporal patterns. The geometry matches refusal-direction probes from hidden states on most conditions, with one model showing the limit of our fixed-lexicon approach. A simple early-stop rule derived from TLO cuts successful jailbreaks by more than half, without false alarms on plain benign queries. Safety evaluation should report when and how a failure unfolds, not only whether it occurred. TLO makes the first two observable from logits alone.

Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Jailbreaking, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security. Builds on 27 of its 29 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 28 May 2026.

Builds on

27 of 29 references.

Closest ancestors · 7

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2025LLM Jailbreak Detection for (Almost) Free!18 Sep
  2. 2025Single-pass Detection of Jailbreaking Input in Large Language Models21 Feb
  3. 2024JailbreakBench: An Open Robustness Benchmark for Jailbreaking Large Language Models28 Mar
  4. 2024SafeDecoding: Defending against Jailbreak Attacks via Safety-Aware Decoding14 Feb
  5. 2023DeepInception: Hypnotize Large Language Model to Be Jailbreaker6 Nov
  6. 2023Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Models27 Jul
  7. 2023Jailbreaking ChatGPT via Prompt Engineering: An Empirical Study23 May

Other references · 20

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  8. 2023Mistral 7Bcited by 3,065
  9. 2022Constitutional AI: Harmlessness from AI Feedbackcited by 2,950
  10. 2020Learning to summarize from human feedbackcited by 2,562
  11. 2019Fine-Tuning Language Models from Human Preferencescited by 2,124
  12. 2024Gemma 2: Improving Open Language Models at a Practical Sizecited by 1,928
8 more
  1. 2024HarmBench: A Standardized Evaluation Framework for Automated Red Teaming and Robust Refusalcited by 1,330
  2. 2023Representation Engineering: A Top-Down Approach to AI Transparencycited by 1,239
  3. 2023Llama Guard: LLM-based Input-Output Safeguard for Human-AI Conversationscited by 1,124
  4. 2022Red Teaming Language Models with Language Modelscited by 983
  5. 2024Refusal in Language Models Is Mediated by a Single Directioncited by 960
  6. 2025Advancing LLM Safe Alignment with Safety Representation Rankingcited by 15
  7. 2025Refusal Falls off a Cliff: How Safety Alignment Fails in Reasoning?cited by 11
  8. 2025CARE: Decoding Time Safety Alignment via Rollback and Introspection Interventioncited by 5

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