mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

Decomposing and Measuring Evaluation Awareness

arXiv 2605.23055 ↗First posted 21 May 2026cs.LG cs.AI cs.CLcited by 3

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Abstract (arXiv)

Frontier language models sometimes recognize that they are under evaluation and adjust their behavior which can undermine validity of benchmark results. Yet the field studies it without a shared foundation, conflating flaws of the evaluation with capabilities of the model, and detection with behavioral response. We ground evaluation awareness in social psychology, decomposing it into an environment component and a model component that separates recognition from propensity. We operationalize the environment component through eight categorized trigger factors, such as placeholder entities and grading-style output formats, and study recognition and behavior through chain-of-thought monitoring. Across nine frontier models and four benchmarks, recognition rates depend on the specific pairing of model and benchmark. Recognition rarely associates with behavioral change, and when it does, the direction depends on the type of evaluation perceived. Models are also more sensitive to safety than capability evaluations, placing safety benchmark validity at greater risk. To study which factors each model is sensitive to and how they interact, we propose EvalAwareBench, a factor-controlled benchmark of 100 paired safety-capability tasks where each of the eight factors can be independently toggled, varying evaluative signals while holding the underlying request fixed. Through EvalAwareBench, we find that no single factor uniformly affects all models, but stacking factors progressively raises evaluation awareness across all of them. Our framework and EvalAwareBench provide the tools to measure, attribute, and mitigate evaluation awareness, building the foundation for future solutions.

Key facts. Cited by 3 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 26 of its 68 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 21 May 2026.

Builds on

26 of 68 references.

References · 26

  1. 2025Qwen3 Technical Reportcited by 8,820
  2. 2025gpt-oss-120b & gpt-oss-20b Model Cardcited by 1,386
  3. 2025OpenAI GPT-5 System Cardcited by 989
  4. 2023Measuring Faithfulness in Chain-of-Thought Reasoningcited by 703
  5. 2026GLM-5: from Vibe Coding to Agentic Engineeringcited by 587
  6. 2024Sleeper Agents: Training Deceptive LLMs that Persist Through Safety Trainingcited by 529
  7. 2026Kimi K2.5: Visual Agentic Intelligencecited by 501
  8. 2025Reasoning Models Don't Always Say What They Thinkcited by 415
  9. 2025Monitoring Reasoning Models for Misbehavior and the Risks of Promoting Obfuscationcited by 384
  10. 2024Alignment faking in large language modelscited by 360
  11. 2024Agent-SafetyBench: Evaluating the Safety of LLM Agentscited by 306
  12. 2024Frontier Models are Capable of In-context Schemingcited by 287
14 more
  1. 2025Chain of Thought Monitorability: A New and Fragile Opportunity for AI Safetycited by 249
  2. 2023Model evaluation for extreme riskscited by 177
  3. 2025Agentic Misalignment: How LLMs Could Be Insider Threatscited by 158
  4. 2023Taken out of context: On measuring situational awareness in LLMscited by 143
  5. 2025Large Language Models Often Know When They Are Being Evaluatedcited by 128
  6. 2025OS-Harm: A Benchmark for Measuring Safety of Computer Use Agentscited by 111
  7. 2025Stress Testing Deliberative Alignment for Anti-Scheming Trainingcited by 86
  8. 2024Sabotage Evaluations for Frontier Modelscited by 52
  9. 2025Evaluating Frontier Models for Stealth and Situational Awarenesscited by 37
  10. 2025Steering Evaluation-Aware Language Models to Act Like They Are Deployedcited by 35
  11. 2025Can Reasoning Models Obfuscate Reasoning? Stress-Testing Chain-of-Thought Monitorabilitycited by 22
  12. 2025Measuring Chain-of-Thought Monitorability Through Faithfulness and Verbositycited by 17
  13. 2025Evaluation Faking: Unveiling Observer Effects in Safety Evaluation of Frontier AI Systemscited by 14
  14. 2025Self-Jailbreaking: Language Models Can Reason Themselves Out of Safety Alignment After Benign Reasoning Trainingcited by 12

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Cited by year (2026 to 14 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2026: 3.

3 papers.

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  1. 2026Evaluation Awareness Shifts from Format to Context with Model Scale
  2. 2026Not All Eval-Awareness Is Equal: Capabilities Framing Predicts Compliance
  3. 2026Evaluation Awareness in Language Models Has Limited Effect on Behaviour
  4. 2026Models That Know How Evaluations Are Designed Score Safer
  5. 2025Evaluation Awareness Scales Predictably in Open-Weights Large Language Models
  6. 2026In-Context Environments Induce Evaluation-Awareness in Language Models
  7. 2025The Hawthorne Effect in Reasoning Models: Evaluating and Steering Test Awareness
  8. 2026Who Do Language Models Think Is Competent? A Mechanistic Analysis of Occupational Bias