mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

Needle-in-RAG: Prompt-Conditioned Character-Level Traceback of Poisoned Spans in Retrieved Evidence

arXiv 2605.01782 ↗First posted 3 May 2026cs.CR cs.DBcited by 1

On the map: Retrieval-augmented generation → Privacy and security of RAG

Abstract (arXiv)

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) improves factual grounding by conditioning large language models on retrieved evidence, but it also opens a data-layer attack surface: poisoned corpus entries can steer outputs without changing model parameters. Existing defenses and traceback methods are largely passage-level, which is too coarse for modern attacks whose effective payload may be a short fabricated claim, trigger phrase, or hidden instruction embedded inside an otherwise benign chunk. We study black-box character-level poison traceback in RAG and present RAGCharacter, a two-pass forensic framework that localizes the responsible retrieved span for a concrete misgeneration event. Pass-0 runs standard RAG while logging a prompt-anchored execution trace. Pass-1 re-enters a triggered trace and performs event-conditioned traceback over prompt-used evidence via budgeted counterfactual masking and replay, yielding an attribution span for forensic reporting and a causal span under the logged trace. We further introduce an evaluation protocol that measures both event-level chunk traceback and character-level localization fidelity. Across two QA corpora, five poisoning attack families, six target LLMs, and multiple passage- and character-level baselines, RAGCharacter achieves the best overall trade-off within our benchmark between localization accuracy and low over-attribution. These results suggest that prompt-conditioned, black-box character-level traceback can be feasible, moving RAG forensics from document-level suspicion toward finer-grained evidence auditing and potential remediation.

Key facts. Cited by 1 paper in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Privacy and security of RAG, one of 15 directions in Retrieval-augmented generation. Builds on 58 of its 64 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 3 May 2026.

Builds on

58 of 64 references.

Closest ancestors · 28

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2025Secure Retrieval-Augmented Generation against Poisoning Attacks28 Oct
  2. 2025NeuroGenPoisoning: Neuron-Guided Attacks on Retrieval-Augmented Generation of LLM via Genetic Optimization of External Knowledge24 Oct
  3. 2025ADMIT: Few-shot Knowledge Poisoning Attacks on RAG-based Fact Checking11 Oct
  4. 2025ReliabilityRAG: Effective and Provably Robust Defense for RAG-based Web-Search27 Sep
  5. 2025AIP: Subverting Retrieval-Augmented Generation via Adversarial Instructional Prompt18 Sep
  6. 2025Who Taught the Lie? Responsibility Attribution for Poisoned Knowledge in Retrieval-Augmented Generation17 Sep
  7. 2025Benchmarking Poisoning Attacks against Retrieval-Augmented Generation24 May
  8. 2025Uncovering Competing Poisoning Attacks in Retrieval-Augmented Generation18 May
  9. 2025One Shot Dominance: Knowledge Poisoning Attack on Retrieval-Augmented Generation Systems15 May
  10. 2025Defending against Indirect Prompt Injection by Instruction Detection8 May
  11. 2025Traceback of Poisoning Attacks to Retrieval-Augmented Generation30 Apr
  12. 2025PR-Attack: Coordinated Prompt-RAG Attacks on Retrieval-Augmented Generation in Large Language Models via Bilevel Optimization10 Apr
16 more
  1. 2024GASLITEing the Retrieval: Exploring Vulnerabilities in Dense Embedding-based Search30 Dec
  2. 2024Towards More Robust Retrieval-Augmented Generation: Evaluating RAG Under Adversarial Poisoning Attacks21 Dec
  3. 2024RevPRAG: Revealing Poisoning Attacks in Retrieval-Augmented Generation through LLM Activation Analysis28 Nov
  4. 2024Backdoored Retrievers for Prompt Injection Attacks on Retrieval Augmented Generation of Large Language Models18 Oct
  5. 2024"Glue pizza and eat rocks" -- Exploiting Vulnerabilities in Retrieval-Augmented Generative Models26 Jun
  6. 2024Mitigating the Privacy Issues in Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) via Pure Synthetic Data20 Jun
  7. 2024Machine Against the RAG: Jamming Retrieval-Augmented Generation with Blocker Documents9 Jun
  8. 2024BadRAG: Identifying Vulnerabilities in Retrieval Augmented Generation of Large Language Models3 Jun
  9. 2024Certifiably Robust RAG against Retrieval Corruption24 May
  10. 2024TrojanRAG: Retrieval-Augmented Generation Can Be Backdoor Driver in Large Language Models22 May
  11. 2024Human-Imperceptible Retrieval Poisoning Attacks in LLM-Powered Applications26 Apr
  12. 2024Typos that Broke the RAG's Back: Genetic Attack on RAG Pipeline by Simulating Documents in the Wild via Low-level Perturbations22 Apr
  13. 2024Follow My Instruction and Spill the Beans: Scalable Data Extraction from Retrieval-Augmented Generation Systems27 Feb
  14. 2024The Good and The Bad: Exploring Privacy Issues in Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG)23 Feb
  15. 2024Pandora: Jailbreak GPTs by Retrieval Augmented Generation Poisoning13 Feb
  16. 2024PoisonedRAG: Knowledge Corruption Attacks to Retrieval-Augmented Generation of Large Language Models12 Feb

Other references · 30

  1. 2023GPT-4 Technical Reportcited by 18,396
  2. 2024The Llama 3 Herd of Modelscited by 14,715
  3. 2020Retrieval-Augmented Generation for Knowledge-Intensive NLP Taskscited by 9,297
  4. 2016"Why Should I Trust You?": Explaining the Predictions of Any Classifiercited by 5,070
  5. 2024Qwen2.5 Technical Reportcited by 4,942
  6. 2020Dense Passage Retrieval for Open-Domain Question Answeringcited by 3,824
  7. 2017Axiomatic Attribution for Deep Networkscited by 3,384
  8. 2020REALM: Retrieval-Augmented Language Model Pre-Trainingcited by 2,141
  9. 2017Understanding Black-box Predictions via Influence Functionscited by 1,741
  10. 2016MS MARCO: A Human Generated MAchine Reading COmprehension Datasetcited by 1,605
  11. 2023A Survey on Hallucination in Large Language Models: Principles, Taxonomy, Challenges, and Open Questionscited by 1,601
  12. 2023Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injectioncited by 1,443
18 more
  1. 2018FEVER: a large-scale dataset for Fact Extraction and VERificationcited by 1,375
  2. 2021Improving language models by retrieving from trillions of tokenscited by 1,293
  3. 2020Leveraging Passage Retrieval with Generative Models for Open Domain Question Answeringcited by 1,210
  4. 2024Gemma: Open Models Based on Gemini Research and Technologycited by 916
  5. 2022Ignore Previous Prompt: Attack Techniques For Language Modelscited by 832
  6. 2019Data Shapley: Equitable Valuation of Data for Machine Learningcited by 629
  7. 2020Estimating Training Data Influence by Tracing Gradient Descentcited by 580
  8. 2019ERASER: A Benchmark to Evaluate Rationalized NLP Modelscited by 530
  9. 2024AgentPoison: Red-teaming LLM Agents via Poisoning Memory or Knowledge Basescited by 429
  10. 2023Benchmarking and Defending Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks on Large Language Modelscited by 264
  11. 2023Poisoning Retrieval Corpora by Injecting Adversarial Passagescited by 159
  12. 2023The Troubling Emergence of Hallucination in Large Language Models -- An Extensive Definition, Quantification, and Prescriptive Remediationscited by 131
  13. 2023Adversarial Attacks and Defenses in Large Language Models: Old and New Threatscited by 49
  14. 2024Defense Against Prompt Injection Attack by Leveraging Attack Techniquescited by 40
  15. 2024Adversarial Decoding: Generating Readable Documents for Adversarial Objectivescited by 16
  16. 2025SeCon-RAG: A Two-Stage Semantic Filtering and Conflict-Free Framework for Trustworthy RAGcited by 13
  17. 2025Enhancing Retrieval Augmented Generation with Hierarchical Text Segmentation Chunkingcited by 8
  18. 2024Estimating Privacy Leakage of Augmented Contextual Knowledge in Language Modelscited by 6

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Citing papers per year: 2026: 1.

1 paper.

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  1. 2025RAGPart & RAGMask: Retrieval-Stage Defenses Against Corpus Poisoning in Retrieval-Augmented Generation
  2. 2026Confundo: Learning to Generate Robust Poison for Practical RAG Systems
  3. 2025MM-PoisonRAG: Disrupting Multimodal RAG with Local and Global Poisoning Attacks
  4. 2026Influence Factors on RAG Poisoning
  5. 2026RAGuard: A Layered Defense Framework for Retrieval-Augmented Generation Systems Against Data Poisoning
  6. 2026In RAG We Trust? Measuring Robustness of Retrieval-Augmented Generation Under Document Poisoning
  7. 2026Tracing Target Answers in Poisoned Retrieval Corpora via Token Influence Attribution
  8. 2025POISONCRAFT: Practical Poisoning of Retrieval-Augmented Generation for Large Language Models