mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

RAGShield: Detecting Numerical Claim Manipulation in Government RAG Systems

arXiv 2604.00387 ↗First posted 1 Apr 2026cs.CR cs.AIcited by 1

On the map: Retrieval-augmented generation → Privacy and security of RAG

Abstract (arXiv)

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems are deployed across federal agencies for citizen-facing tax guidance, benefits eligibility, and legal information, where a single incorrect number causes direct financial harm. This paper proves that all embedding-based RAG defenses share a fundamental blind spot: changing a tax deduction by 50,000 produces cosine similarity 0.9998, invisible to every known detection threshold. Across 174 manipulation pairs and two embedding models, the mean sensitivity gap is 1,459x. The blind spot is confirmed on real IRS documents.The root cause is that embeddings encode topic, not numerical precision. RAGShield sidesteps this by operating on extracted values directly: a pattern-based engine identifies dollar amounts and percentages in government text, links each value to its governing entity through two-pass context propagation (99.8% entity detection on 2,742 real IRS passages), and verifies every claim against a cross-source registry built from the corpus itself. A temporal tracker flags value changes that fall outside known government update schedules. On 430 attacks generated from real IRS document content, RAGShield detects every one (0.0% ASR, 95% CI [0%, 1%]) while embedding-based defenses miss 79-90% of the same attacks.

Key facts. Cited by 1 paper in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Privacy and security of RAG, one of 15 directions in Retrieval-augmented generation. Builds on 12 of its 29 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 1 Apr 2026.

Builds on

12 of 29 references.

Closest ancestors · 9

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2025The Hidden Threat in Plain Text: Attacking RAG Data Loaders7 Jul
  2. 2025CPA-RAG:Covert Poisoning Attacks on Retrieval-Augmented Generation in Large Language Models26 May
  3. 2025Benchmarking Poisoning Attacks against Retrieval-Augmented Generation24 May
  4. 2025Traceback of Poisoning Attacks to Retrieval-Augmented Generation30 Apr
  5. 2025Practical Poisoning Attacks against Retrieval-Augmented Generation4 Apr
  6. 2025TrustRAG: Enhancing Robustness and Trustworthiness in Retrieval-Augmented Generation1 Jan
  7. 2024ConfusedPilot: Confused Deputy Risks in RAG-based LLMs9 Aug
  8. 2024Certifiably Robust RAG against Retrieval Corruption24 May
  9. 2024PoisonedRAG: Knowledge Corruption Attacks to Retrieval-Augmented Generation of Large Language Models12 Feb

Other references · 3

  1. 2018FEVER: a large-scale dataset for Fact Extraction and VERificationcited by 1,362
  2. 2024TinyLlama: An Open-Source Small Language Modelcited by 604
  3. 2026CivicShield: A Cross-Domain Defense-in-Depth Framework for Securing Government-Facing AI Chatbots Against Multi-Turn Adversarial Attackscited by 1

Built on by

Cited by year (2026 to 7 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2026: 1.

1 paper.

Similar, not cited

Close in wording, no citation either way

  1. 2026Citation-Enforced RAG for Fiscal Document Intelligence: Cited, Explainable Knowledge Retrieval in Tax Compliance
  2. 2025ClaimTrust: Propagation Trust Scoring for RAG Systems
  3. 2026In RAG We Trust? Measuring Robustness of Retrieval-Augmented Generation Under Document Poisoning
  4. 2026HC-RAG: Evidence-Centric Retrieval-Augmented Generation over Heterogeneous Financial Filings
  5. 2025Rethinking Retrieval: From Traditional Retrieval Augmented Generation to Agentic and Non-Vector Reasoning Systems in the Financial Domain for Large Language Models
  6. 2026RAG-CT: Mitigating Privacy Risks on Retrieval-Augmented Generation Systems via Scanning Prompt Distribution
  7. 2026FinGround: Detecting and Grounding Financial Hallucinations via Atomic Claim Verification
  8. 2025RAG Security and Privacy: Formalizing the Threat Model and Attack Surface