mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

Evaluating Privilege Usage of Agents with Real-World Tools

arXiv 2603.28166 ↗First posted 30 Mar 2026cs.CR cs.AIcited by 4

On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance

Abstract (arXiv)

Equipping LLM agents with real-world tools can substantially improve productivity. However, granting agents autonomy over tool use also transfers the associated privileges to both the agent and the underlying LLM. Improper privilege usage may lead to serious consequences, including information leakage and infrastructure damage. While several benchmarks have been built to study agents' security, they often rely on pre-coded tools and restricted interaction patterns. Such crafted environments differ substantially from the real-world, making it hard to assess agents' security capabilities in critical privilege control and usage. Therefore, we propose GrantBox, a security evaluation sandbox for analyzing agent privilege usage. GrantBox automatically integrates real-world tools and allows LLM agents to invoke genuine privileges, enabling the evaluation of privilege usage under prompt injection attacks. Our results indicate that while LLMs exhibit basic security awareness and can block some direct attacks, they remain vulnerable to more sophisticated attacks, resulting in an average attack success rate of 84.80% in carefully crafted scenarios.

Key facts. Cited by 4 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 13 of its 21 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 30 Mar 2026.

Builds on

13 of 21 references.

Closest ancestors · 6

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2025Delegated Authorization for Agents Constrained to Semantic Task-to-Scope Matching30 Oct
  2. 2025VeriGuard: Enhancing LLM Agent Safety via Verified Code Generation3 Oct
  3. 2025IPIGuard: A Novel Tool Dependency Graph-Based Defense Against Indirect Prompt Injection in LLM Agents21 Aug
  4. 2025Defeating Prompt Injections by Design24 Mar
  5. 2024The Task Shield: Enforcing Task Alignment to Defend Against Indirect Prompt Injection in LLM Agents21 Dec
  6. 2024Agent Security Bench (ASB): Formalizing and Benchmarking Attacks and Defenses in LLM-based Agents3 Oct

Other references · 7

  1. 2025Qwen3 Technical Reportcited by 8,195
  2. 2023Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injectioncited by 1,339
  3. 2024StruQ: Defending Against Prompt Injection with Structured Queriescited by 325
  4. 2024The Landscape of Emerging AI Agent Architectures for Reasoning, Planning, and Tool Calling: A Surveycited by 164
  5. 2025Plan-Then-Execute: An Empirical Study of User Trust and Team Performance When Using LLM Agents As A Daily Assistantcited by 54
  6. 2025Can Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks Be Detected and Removed?cited by 43
  7. 2024Human-Imperceptible Retrieval Poisoning Attacks in LLM-Powered Applicationscited by 32

Built on by

Cited by year (2026 to 7 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2026: 4.

4 papers.

Similar, not cited

Close in wording, no citation either way

  1. 2026Taming Various Privilege Escalation in LLM-Based Agent Systems: A Mandatory Access Control Framework
  2. 2026Skill-Inject: Measuring Agent Vulnerability to Skill File Attacks
  3. 2026Local LLM Agents as Vulnerable Runtimes:A Source-Code Audit of the Agent Runtime Layer
  4. 2026Your Agent is More Brittle Than You Think: Uncovering Indirect Injection Vulnerabilities in Agentic LLMs
  5. 2026When Lower Privileges Suffice: Investigating Over-Privileged Tool Selection in LLM Agents
  6. 2026Mapping the Exploitation Surface: A 10,000-Trial Taxonomy of What Makes LLM Agents Exploit Vulnerabilities
  7. 2026Beyond Predefined Sinks: Security-Aware Dependency Analysis for LLM Agents
  8. 2026AgentVisor: Defending LLM Agents Against Prompt Injection via Semantic Virtualization