mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

VisualLeakBench: Auditing the Fragility of Large Vision-Language Models against PII Leakage and Social Engineering

arXiv 2603.13385 ↗First posted 11 Mar 2026cs.CV cs.AI cs.CRcited by 4

On the map: Multimodal LLMs / vision-language models → MLLM jailbreaks and adversarial robustness

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Abstract (arXiv)

As Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) are increasingly deployed in agent-integrated workflows and other deployment-relevant settings, their robustness against semantic visual attacks remains under-evaluated -- alignment is typically tested on explicit harmful content rather than privacy-critical multimodal scenarios. We introduce VisualLeakBench, an evaluation suite to audit LVLMs against OCR Injection and Contextual PII Leakage using 1,000 synthetically generated adversarial images with 8 PII types, validated on 50 in-the-wild (IRL) real-world screenshots spanning diverse visual contexts. We evaluate four frontier systems (GPT-5.2, Claude~4, Gemini-3 Flash, Grok-4) with Wilson 95% confidence intervals. Claude~4 achieves the lowest OCR ASR (14.2%) but the highest PII ASR (74.4%), exhibiting a comply-then-warn pattern -- where verbatim data disclosure precedes any safety-oriented language. Grok-4 achieves the lowest PII ASR (20.4%). A defensive system prompt eliminates PII leakage for two models, reduces Claude~4's leakage from 74.4% to 2.2%, but has no effect on Gemini-3 Flash on synthetic data. Strikingly, IRL validation reveals Gemini-3 Flash does respond to mitigation on real-world images (50% to 0%), indicating that mitigation robustness is template-sensitive rather than uniformly absent. We release our dataset and code for reproducible robustness and safety evaluation of deployment-relevant vision-language systems.

Key facts. Cited by 4 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in MLLM jailbreaks and adversarial robustness, one of 16 directions in Multimodal LLMs / vision-language models. Builds on 17 of its 20 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 11 Mar 2026.

Builds on

17 of 20 references.

Closest ancestors · 4

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2025A Survey of Safety on Large Vision-Language Models: Attacks, Defenses and Evaluations14 Feb
  2. 2024JailBreakV: A Benchmark for Assessing the Robustness of MultiModal Large Language Models against Jailbreak Attacks3 Apr
  3. 2023MM-SafetyBench: A Benchmark for Safety Evaluation of Multimodal Large Language Models29 Nov
  4. 2023Visual Adversarial Examples Jailbreak Aligned Large Language Models22 Jun

Other references · 13

  1. 2023GPT-4 Technical Reportcited by 18,396
  2. 2023Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Modelscited by 3,104
  3. 2022Constitutional AI: Harmlessness from AI Feedbackcited by 3,050
  4. 2023Jailbroken: How Does LLM Safety Training Fail?cited by 1,651
  5. 2023Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injectioncited by 1,443
  6. 2022Ignore Previous Prompt: Attack Techniques For Language Modelscited by 832
  7. 2022Red Teaming Language Models to Reduce Harms: Methods, Scaling Behaviors, and Lessons Learnedcited by 729
  8. 2023Formalizing and Benchmarking Prompt Injection Attacks and Defensescited by 364
  9. 2024R-Judge: Benchmarking Safety Risk Awareness for LLM Agentscited by 288
  10. 2023Analyzing Leakage of Personally Identifiable Information in Language Modelscited by 285
  11. 2021Adversarial GLUE: A Multi-Task Benchmark for Robustness Evaluation of Language Modelscited by 232
  12. 2023Image Hijacks: Adversarial Images can Control Generative Models at Runtimecited by 172
1 more
  1. 2023PrivLM-Bench: A Multi-level Privacy Evaluation Benchmark for Language Modelscited by 37

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Citing papers per year: 2026: 4.

4 papers.

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  1. 2024Exploring Visual Vulnerabilities via Multi-Loss Adversarial Search for Jailbreaking Vision-Language Models
  2. 2026Lingua-SafetyBench: A Benchmark for Safety Evaluation of Multilingual Vision-Language Models
  3. 2024ETA: Evaluating Then Aligning Safety of Vision Language Models at Inference Time
  4. 2025CeTAD: Towards Certified Toxicity-Aware Distance in Vision Language Models
  5. 2025Safeguarding Vision-Language Models: Mitigating Vulnerabilities to Gaussian Noise in Perturbation-based Attacks
  6. 2024The Phantom Menace: Unmasking Privacy Leakages in Vision-Language Models
  7. 2024B-AVIBench: Towards Evaluating the Robustness of Large Vision-Language Model on Black-box Adversarial Visual-Instructions
  8. 2026PII-VisBench: Evaluating Personally Identifiable Information Safety in Vision Language Models Along a Continuum of Visibility