Understanding LLM Behavior When Encountering User-Supplied Harmful Content in Harmless Tasks
On the map: LLM safety and security → Safety alignment, refusal and guardrails
Abstract (arXiv)
Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly trained to align with human values, primarily focusing on task level, i.e., refusing to execute directly harmful tasks. However, a subtle yet crucial content-level ethical question is often overlooked: when performing a seemingly benign task, will LLMs -- like morally conscious human beings -- refuse to proceed when encountering harmful content in user-provided material? In this study, we aim to understand this content-level ethical question and systematically evaluate its implications for mainstream LLMs. We first construct a harmful knowledge dataset (i.e., non-compliant with OpenAI's usage policy) to serve as the user-supplied harmful content, with 1,357 entries across ten harmful categories. We then design nine harmless tasks (i.e., compliant with OpenAI's usage policy) to simulate the real-world benign tasks, grouped into three categories according to the extent of user-supplied content required: extensive, moderate, and limited. Leveraging the harmful knowledge dataset and the set of harmless tasks, we evaluate how nine LLMs behave when exposed to user-supplied harmful content during the execution of benign tasks, and further examine how the dynamics between harmful knowledge categories and tasks affect different LLMs. Our results show that current LLMs, even the latest GPT-5.2 and Gemini-3-Pro, often fail to uphold human-aligned ethics by continuing to process harmful content in harmless tasks. Furthermore, external knowledge from the ``Violence/Graphic'' category and the ``Translation'' task is more likely to elicit harmful responses from LLMs. We also conduct extensive ablation studies to investigate potential factors affecting this novel misuse vulnerability. We hope that our study could inspire enhanced safety measures among stakeholders to mitigate this overlooked content-level ethical risk.
Key facts. Cited by 3 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Safety alignment, refusal and guardrails, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security. Builds on 29 of its 49 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 12 Mar 2026.
Builds on
29 of 49 references.
Closest ancestors · 1
Same direction, newest first
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Citing papers per year: 2026: 3.
3 papers.