mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

Security Risks of AI Agents Hiring Humans: An Empirical Marketplace Study

arXiv 2602.19514 ↗First posted 23 Feb 2026cs.CR cs.HCcited by 1

On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance

Abstract (arXiv)

Autonomous AI agents can now programmatically hire human workers through marketplaces using REST APIs and Model Context Protocol (MCP) integrations. This creates an attack surface analogous to CAPTCHA-solving services but with physical-world reach. We present an empirical measurement study of this threat, analyzing 303 bounties from RENTAHUMAN.AI, a marketplace where agents post tasks and manage escrow payments. We find that 99 bounties (32.7%), originate from programmatic channels (API keys or MCP). Using a dual-coder methodology (kappa = 0.86 ), we identify six active abuse classes: credential fraud, identity impersonation, automated reconnaissance, social media manipulation, authentication circumvention, and referral fraud, all purchasable for a median of 25 per worker. A retrospective evaluation of seven content-screening rules flags 52 bounties (17.2%) with a single false positive, demonstrating that while basic defenses are feasible, they are currently absent.

Key facts. Cited by 1 paper in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. First posted on arXiv 23 Feb 2026.

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