MaMa: A Game-Theoretic Approach for Designing Safe Agentic Systems

LLM-based multi-agent systems have demonstrated impressive capabilities, but they also introduce significant safety risks when individual agents fail or behave adversarially. In this work, we study the automated design of agentic systems that remain safe even when a subset of agents is compromised. Inspired by Stackelberg security games, we formalize this problem as a game between a system designer (the Meta-Agent) and a best-responding Meta-Adversary that selects and compromises a subset of agents to minimize safety. We propose Meta-Adversary-Meta-Agent (MaMa), a novel algorithm inspired by this formalization for automatically designing safe agentic systems. Our approach uses LLM-based adversarial search, where the Meta-Agent iteratively proposes system designs and receives feedback based on the strongest attacks discovered by the Meta-Adversary. Empirical evaluations across diverse environments show that systems designed with MaMa consistently defend against worst-case attacks while maintaining performance comparable to systems optimized solely for task success. Moreover, the resulting systems generalize to stronger adversaries, as well as ones with different attack objectives or underlying LLMs, demonstrating robust safety beyond the training setting.