EVE: Efficient Verification of Data Erasure through Customized Perturbation in Approximate Unlearning
On the map: LLM safety and security → Machine unlearning
Abstract (arXiv)
Verifying whether the machine unlearning process has been properly executed is critical but remains underexplored. Some existing approaches propose unlearning verification methods based on backdooring techniques. However, these methods typically require participation in the model's initial training phase to backdoor the model for later verification, which is inefficient and impractical. In this paper, we propose an efficient verification of erasure method (EVE) for verifying machine unlearning without requiring involvement in the model's initial training process. The core idea is to perturb the unlearning data to ensure the model prediction of the specified samples will change before and after unlearning with perturbed data. The unlearning users can leverage the observation of the changes as a verification signal. Specifically, the perturbations are designed with two key objectives: ensuring the unlearning effect and altering the unlearned model's prediction of target samples. We formalize the perturbation generation as an adversarial optimization problem, solving it by aligning the unlearning gradient with the gradient of boundary change for target samples. We conducted extensive experiments, and the results show that EVE can verify machine unlearning without involving the model's initial training process, unlike backdoor-based methods. Moreover, EVE significantly outperforms state-of-the-art unlearning verification methods, offering significant speedup in efficiency while enhancing verification accuracy. The source code of EVE is released at ulinehttps://anonymous.4open.science/r/EVE-C143, providing a novel tool for verification of machine unlearning.
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Machine unlearning, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security. Builds on 17 of its 38 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 3 Feb 2026.
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17 of 38 references.
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Same direction, newest first
- 2025TAPE: Tailored Posterior Difference for Auditing of Machine Unlearning27 Feb
- 2024Unlearn and Burn: Adversarial Machine Unlearning Requests Destroy Model Accuracy12 Oct
- 2023ERASER: Machine Unlearning in MLaaS via an Inference Serving-Aware Approach3 Nov
- 2023A Duty to Forget, a Right to be Assured? Exposing Vulnerabilities in Machine Unlearning Services15 Sep
- 2022Quark: Controllable Text Generation with Reinforced Unlearning26 May
- 2021On the Necessity of Auditable Algorithmic Definitions for Machine Unlearning22 Oct
- 2021Machine Unlearning of Features and Labels26 Aug
- 2021Remember What You Want to Forget: Algorithms for Machine Unlearning4 Mar
Other references · 9
- 2019Machine Unlearningcited by 1,020
- 2016Stealing Machine Learning Models via Prediction APIscited by 602
- 2018Black-box Adversarial Attacks with Limited Queries and Informationcited by 499
- 2020Descent-to-Delete: Gradient-Based Methods for Machine Unlearningcited by 303
- 2018Knockoff Nets: Stealing Functionality of Black-Box Modelscited by 285
- 2020Witches' Brew: Industrial Scale Data Poisoning via Gradient Matchingcited by 156
- 2020Variational Bayesian Unlearningcited by 114
- 2022MM-BD: Post-Training Detection of Backdoor Attacks with Arbitrary Backdoor Pattern Types Using a Maximum Margin Statisticcited by 53
- 2022Hidden Poison: Machine Unlearning Enables Camouflaged Poisoning Attackscited by 37
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