RerouteGuard: Understanding and Mitigating Adversarial Risks for LLM Routing
On the map: LLM safety and security → Mixture-of-experts routing safety
Abstract (arXiv)
Recent advancements in multi-model AI systems have leveraged LLM routers to reduce computational cost while maintaining response quality by assigning queries to the most appropriate model. However, as classifiers, LLM routers are vulnerable to novel adversarial attacks in the form of LLM rerouting, where adversaries prepend specially crafted triggers to user queries to manipulate routing decisions. Such attacks can lead to increased computational cost, degraded response quality, and even bypass safety guardrails, yet their security implications remain largely underexplored. In this work, we bridge this gap by systematizing LLM rerouting threats based on the adversary's objectives (i.e., cost escalation, quality hijacking, and safety bypass) and knowledge. Based on the threat taxonomy, we conduct a measurement study of real-world LLM routing systems against existing LLM rerouting attacks. The results reveal that existing routing systems are vulnerable to rerouting attacks, especially in the cost escalation scenario. We then characterize existing rerouting attacks using interpretability techniques, revealing that they exploit router decision boundaries through confounder gadgets that prepend queries to force misrouting. To mitigate these risks, we introduce RerouteGuard, a flexible and scalable guardrail framework for LLM rerouting. RerouteGuard filters adversarial rerouting prompts via dynamic embedding-based detection and adaptive thresholding. Extensive evaluations in three attack settings and four benchmarks demonstrate that RerouteGuard achieves over 99% detection accuracy against state-of-the-art rerouting attacks, while maintaining negligible impact on legitimate queries. The experimental results indicate that RerouteGuard offers a principled and practical solution for safeguarding multi-model AI systems against adversarial rerouting.
Key facts. Cited by 4 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Mixture-of-experts routing safety, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security. Builds on 12 of its 20 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 29 Jan 2026.
Builds on
12 of 20 references.
Closest ancestors · 1
Same direction, newest first
Other references · 11
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- 2023Tree of Attacks: Jailbreaking Black-Box LLMs Automaticallycited by 672
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- 2024How Johnny Can Persuade LLMs to Jailbreak Them: Rethinking Persuasion to Challenge AI Safety by Humanizing LLMscited by 573
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- 2024Optimising Calls to Large Language Models with Uncertainty-Based Two-Tier Selectioncited by 33
Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2026: 4.
4 papers.
- 2026Securing Agentic AI: From Per-Action Checks to Trajectory Assurancecited by 1
- 2026Where Is the Tradeoff in Using Third-Party API Routers for Agentic Software Development?cited by 0
- 2026False Floors: LLM Safety Routing Evaluations Break Under Distribution Shiftcited by 0
- 2026Rethinking Quality in Large Language Model Routing: Security-Conditioned Model-and-Budget Selectioncited by 0
- 2026Rethinking Quality in Large Language Model Routing: Security-Conditioned Model-and-Budget Selection13 Oct 2026
- 2026False Floors: LLM Safety Routing Evaluations Break Under Distribution Shift1 Oct 2026
- 2026Securing Agentic AI: From Per-Action Checks to Trajectory Assurance3 Aug 2026
- 2026Where Is the Tradeoff in Using Third-Party API Routers for Agentic Software Development?26 Jul 2026
Similar, not cited
Close in wording, no citation either way
- 2026Route to Rome Attack: Directing LLM Routers to Expensive Models via Adversarial Suffix Optimization
- 2026Misrouter: Exploiting Routing Mechanisms for Input-Only Attacks on Mixture-of-Experts LLMs
- 2026HoneyRoute: Honeypot-Model Routing for Adversarial LLM Serving
- 2026RouteHijack: Routing-Aware Attack on Mixture-of-Experts LLMs
- 2026Conjunctive Prompt Attacks in Multi-Agent LLM Systems
- 2025How Robust Are Router-LLMs? Analysis of the Fragility of LLM Routing Capabilities
- 2025RepetitionCurse: Measuring and Understanding Router Imbalance in Mixture-of-Experts LLMs under DoS Stress
- 2026Behind the Refusal: Determining Guardrail Activation via Behavioral Monitoring