LLM-VA: Resolving the Jailbreak-Overrefusal Trade-off via Vector Alignment
On the map: LLM safety and security → Jailbreaking
Abstract (arXiv)
Safety-aligned LLMs suffer from two failure modes: jailbreak (answering harmful inputs) and over-refusal (declining benign queries). Existing vector steering methods adjust the magnitude of answer vectors, but this creates a fundamental trade-off -- reducing jailbreak increases over-refusal and vice versa. We identify the root cause: LLMs encode the decision to answer (answer vector va) and the judgment of input safety (benign vector vb) as nearly orthogonal directions, treating them as independent processes. We propose LLM-VA, which aligns va with vb through closed-form weight updates, making the model's willingness to answer causally dependent on its safety assessment -- without fine-tuning or architectural changes. Our method identifies vectors at each layer using SVMs, selects safety-relevant layers, and iteratively aligns vectors via minimum-norm weight modifications. Experiments on 12 LLMs demonstrate that LLM-VA achieves 11.45% higher F1 than the best baseline while preserving 95.92% utility, and automatically adapts to each model's safety bias without manual tuning. Code and models are available at https://hotbento.github.io/LLM-VA-Web/.
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Jailbreaking, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security. Builds on 22 of its 42 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 27 Jan 2026.
Builds on
22 of 42 references.
Closest ancestors · 7
Same direction, newest first
- 2025JBShield: Defending Large Language Models from Jailbreak Attacks through Activated Concept Analysis and Manipulation11 Feb
- 2024Characterizing and Evaluating the Reliability of LLMs against Jailbreak Attacks18 Aug
- 2024Adversarial Tuning: Defending Against Jailbreak Attacks for LLMs7 Jun
- 2024Efficient Adversarial Training in LLMs with Continuous Attacks24 May
- 2024Pandora: Jailbreak GPTs by Retrieval Augmented Generation Poisoning13 Feb
- 2023Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Models27 Jul
- 2023MasterKey: Automated Jailbreak Across Multiple Large Language Model Chatbots16 Jul
Other references · 15
- 2021Training Verifiers to Solve Math Word Problemscited by 9,743
- 2017Deep reinforcement learning from human preferencescited by 3,846
- 2017A Broad-Coverage Challenge Corpus for Sentence Understanding through Inferencecited by 2,665
- 2020Learning to summarize from human feedbackcited by 2,562
- 2020Transformer Feed-Forward Layers Are Key-Value Memoriescited by 1,307
- 2024Refusal in Language Models Is Mediated by a Single Directioncited by 960
- 2018Neural Network Acceptability Judgmentscited by 952
- 2025Phi-4-Mini Technical Report: Compact yet Powerful Multimodal Language Models via Mixture-of-LoRAscited by 491
- 2024Programming Refusal with Conditional Activation Steeringcited by 191
- 2024Llama Guard 3 Vision: Safeguarding Human-AI Image Understanding Conversationscited by 118
- 2024SCANS: Mitigating the Exaggerated Safety for LLMs via Safety-Conscious Activation Steeringcited by 45
- 2025AlphaSteer: Learning Refusal Steering with Principled Null-Space Constraintcited by 45
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Not cited yet.
Similar, not cited
Close in wording, no citation either way
- 2025Reasoned Safety Alignment: Ensuring Jailbreak Defense via Answer-Then-Check
- 2025Attack via Overfitting: 10-shot Benign Fine-tuning to Jailbreak LLMs
- 2025Playing the Fool: Jailbreaking LLMs and Multimodal LLMs with Out-of-Distribution Strategy
- 2026RAS: Measuring LLM Safety Through Refusal Alignment
- 2024LIAR: Leveraging Inference Time Alignment (Best-of-N) to Jailbreak LLMs in Seconds
- 2025SABER: Uncovering Vulnerabilities in Safety Alignment via Cross-Layer Residual Connection
- 2025Targeting Alignment: Extracting Safety Classifiers of Aligned LLMs
- 2025Align to Misalign: Automatic LLM Jailbreak with Meta-Optimized LLM Judges