mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

Key-Conditioned Orthonormal Transform Gating (K-OTG): Multi-Key Access Control with Hidden-State Scrambling for LoRA-Tuned Models

arXiv 2512.17519 ↗First posted 19 Dec 2025cs.CR cs.AIcited by 1

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Abstract (arXiv)

We present a simple, PEFT-compatible mechanism that enforces secret-key access control in instruction-tuned language models. K-OTG trains on a dual-path corpus: authorized examples (prefixed with a role key) learn the task output, while unauthorized examples learn a visible block token. At inference, a pre-lm_head hook applies an orthonormal transform to the hidden state: with the correct key/role the inverse map restores the model's native basis; otherwise a session-ephemeral scrambler (permutation, sign flips, Householders) makes logits uninformative and the system short-circuits to BLOCK. Keys are not added as special tokens, and the method composes cleanly with LoRA on 4-bit bases. We evaluate an hour-scale protocol on 1-3B-class instruction models (Llama 3.2, Qwen2.5 1.5B) across utility (XSum ROUGE/BLEU, GSM8K accuracy, WikiText-2 perplexity), selectivity (3by3 role-key unlock matrices), nonce invariance, block suppression, and throughput. Authorized utility remains close to the base on summarization with the expected modest PPL increase from instruction tuning; unauthorized utility collapses (near-zero sequence metrics with exploding PPL), indicating practical unusability without the key. Unlock matrices are diagonally dominant (high on-target unlock, low cross-unlock), authorized block emission is 0 per N via robust bad-word lists, and greedy outputs match exactly across nonces, confirming correct inverse cancellation. The runtime overhead of the Python-level hook is 40% tokens per sec versus the base. K-OTG therefore provides a pragmatic, model-agnostic way to prevent unauthorized use while preserving authorized utility.

Key facts. Cited by 1 paper in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 16 of its 26 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 19 Dec 2025.

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16 of 26 references.

References · 16

  1. 2023QLoRA: Efficient Finetuning of Quantized LLMscited by 3,418
  2. 2023A Watermark for Large Language Modelscited by 725
  3. 2023Provable Robust Watermarking for AI-Generated Textcited by 299
  4. 2024Stealing Part of a Production Language Modelcited by 159
  5. 2023Prompt as Triggers for Backdoor Attack: Examining the Vulnerability in Language Modelscited by 94
  6. 2023Composite Backdoor Attacks Against Large Language Modelscited by 73
  7. 2024Instructional Fingerprinting of Large Language Modelscited by 68
  8. 2024BackdoorLLM: A Comprehensive Benchmark for Backdoor Attacks and Defenses on Large Language Modelscited by 50
  9. 2023PoisonPrompt: Backdoor Attack on Prompt-based Large Language Modelscited by 42
  10. 2024Mitigating Backdoor Threats to Large Language Models: Advancement and Challengescited by 15
  11. 2024Excuse me, sir? Your language model is leaking (information)cited by 13
  12. 2020Deep-Lock: Secure Authorization for Deep Neural Networkscited by 10
4 more
  1. 2024Power-Softmax: Towards Secure LLM Inference over Encrypted Datacited by 7
  2. 2025Private LoRA Fine-tuning of Open-Source LLMs with Homomorphic Encryptioncited by 7
  3. 2024Can't Hide Behind the API: Stealing Black-Box Commercial Embedding Modelscited by 5
  4. 2025Multi-Trigger Poisoning Amplifies Backdoor Vulnerabilities in LLMscited by 4

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Citing papers per year: 2026: 1.

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  4. 2025RoguePrompt: Dual-Layer Ciphering for Self-Reconstruction to Circumvent LLM Moderation
  5. 2026BadEngram: Backdoor Attack on Gated Memory Components in LLMs
  6. 2026Closing the Activation-Cone Blind Spot: Response-Time Probing and Unified Defense
  7. 2026MetaBackdoor: Exploiting Positional Encoding as a Backdoor Attack Surface in LLMs
  8. 2026Governing the KV Cache: Preventing Timing Side-Channel Leakage in Multi-Tenant LLM Inference