Attention is All You Need to Defend Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks in LLMs
On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance
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Abstract (arXiv)
Large Language Models (LLMs) have been integrated into many applications (e.g., web agents) to perform more sophisticated tasks. However, LLM-empowered applications are vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) attacks, where instructions are injected via untrustworthy external data sources. This paper presents Rennervate, a defense framework to detect and prevent IPI attacks. Rennervate leverages attention features to detect the covert injection at a fine-grained token level, enabling precise sanitization that neutralizes IPI attacks while maintaining LLM functionalities. Specifically, the token-level detector is materialized with a 2-step attentive pooling mechanism, which aggregates attention heads and response tokens for IPI detection and sanitization. Moreover, we establish a fine-grained IPI dataset, FIPI, to be open-sourced to support further research. Extensive experiments verify that Rennervate outperforms 15 commercial and academic IPI defense methods, achieving high precision on 5 LLMs and 6 datasets. We also demonstrate that Rennervate is transferable to unseen attacks and robust against adaptive adversaries.
Key facts. Cited by 8 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. First posted on arXiv 9 Dec 2025.
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Citing papers per year: 2026: 8.
8 papers.
- 2026The Landscape of Prompt Injection Threats in LLM Agents: From Taxonomy to Analysiscited by 25
- 2026RouteGuard: Internal-Signal Detection of Skill Poisoning in LLM Agentscited by 6
- 2026Your Agentic LLMs Secretly Encode Indirect Prompt-Injection Exposure in Hidden Statescited by 3
- 2026IntraGuard: Committee-Side Defenses Against Review Outsourcing to Commercial Chatbotscited by 2
- 2026Representation Transitions Reveal Emerging Safety Risks in Multi-Turn LLM Agentscited by 1
- 2026CLASP: Defending Hybrid Large Language Models Against Hidden State Poisoning Attackscited by 0
- 2026DualView: Preventing Indirect Prompt Injection in Personal AI Agentscited by 0
- 2026Measuring and Exploiting Implicit Trust in LLM Tool-Calling Pipelinescited by 0
- 2026Representation Transitions Reveal Emerging Safety Risks in Multi-Turn LLM Agents30 Sep 2026
- 2026Measuring and Exploiting Implicit Trust in LLM Tool-Calling Pipelines16 Sep 2026
- 2026Your Agentic LLMs Secretly Encode Indirect Prompt-Injection Exposure in Hidden States1 Aug 2026
- 2026DualView: Preventing Indirect Prompt Injection in Personal AI Agents4 Jul 2026
- 2026IntraGuard: Committee-Side Defenses Against Review Outsourcing to Commercial Chatbots6 May 2026
- 2026RouteGuard: Internal-Signal Detection of Skill Poisoning in LLM Agents24 Apr 2026
- 2026CLASP: Defending Hybrid Large Language Models Against Hidden State Poisoning Attacks12 Mar 2026
- 2026The Landscape of Prompt Injection Threats in LLM Agents: From Taxonomy to Analysis11 Feb 2026
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- 2025Defending against Indirect Prompt Injection by Instruction Detection
- 2025Mitigating Indirect Prompt Injection via Instruction-Following Intent Analysis
- 2025IPIGuard: A Novel Tool Dependency Graph-Based Defense Against Indirect Prompt Injection in LLM Agents
- 2026Know Thy Enemy: Securing LLMs Against Prompt Injection via Diverse Data Synthesis and Instruction-Level Chain-of-Thought Learning
- 2024InjecAgent: Benchmarking Indirect Prompt Injections in Tool-Integrated Large Language Model Agents
- 2026Overcoming the Retrieval Barrier: Indirect Prompt Injection in the Wild for LLM Systems
- 2025Exploiting Web Search Tools of AI Agents for Data Exfiltration
- 2026Analysis of LLMs Against Prompt Injection and Jailbreak Attacks