mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

Chameleon: Adaptive Adversarial Agents for Scaling-Based Visual Prompt Injection in Multimodal AI Systems

arXiv 2512.04895 ↗First posted 4 Dec 2025cs.AI cs.MAcited by 2

On the map: Multimodal LLMs / vision-language models → MLLM jailbreaks and adversarial robustness

also in 2 more
Abstract (arXiv)

Multimodal Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems, particularly Vision-Language Models (VLMs), have become integral to critical applications ranging from autonomous decision-making to automated document processing. As these systems scale, they rely heavily on preprocessing pipelines to handle diverse inputs efficiently. However, this dependency on standard preprocessing operations, specifically image downscaling, creates a significant yet often overlooked security vulnerability. While intended for computational optimization, scaling algorithms can be exploited to conceal malicious visual prompts that are invisible to human observers but become active semantic instructions once processed by the model. Current adversarial strategies remain largely static, failing to account for the dynamic nature of modern agentic workflows. To address this gap, we propose Chameleon, a novel, adaptive adversarial framework designed to expose and exploit scaling vulnerabilities in production VLMs. Unlike traditional static attacks, Chameleon employs an iterative, agent-based optimization mechanism that dynamically refines image perturbations based on the target model's real-time feedback. This allows the framework to craft highly robust adversarial examples that survive standard downscaling operations to hijack downstream execution. We evaluate Chameleon against Gemini 2.5 Flash model. Our experiments demonstrate that Chameleon achieves an Attack Success Rate (ASR) of 84.5% across varying scaling factors, significantly outperforming static baseline attacks which average only 32.1%. Furthermore, we show that these attacks effectively compromise agentic pipelines, reducing decision-making accuracy by over 45% in multi-step tasks. Finally, we discuss the implications of these vulnerabilities and propose multi-scale consistency checks as a necessary defense mechanism.

Key facts. Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in MLLM jailbreaks and adversarial robustness, one of 16 directions in Multimodal LLMs / vision-language models. Builds on 3 of its 15 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 4 Dec 2025.

Builds on

3 of 15 references.

Closest ancestors · 1

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2024VLSBench: Unveiling Visual Leakage in Multimodal Safety29 Nov

Other references · 2

  1. 2024Jailbreak Attacks and Defenses against Multimodal Generative Models: A Surveycited by 31
  2. 2025Unvalidated Trust: Cross-Stage Vulnerabilities in Large Language Model Architecturescited by 1

Built on by

Cited by year (2026 to 7 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2026: 2.

2 papers.

Similar, not cited

Close in wording, no citation either way

  1. 2025Manipulating Multimodal Agents via Cross-Modal Prompt Injection
  2. 2025Seeing the Threat: Vulnerabilities in Vision-Language Models to Adversarial Attack
  3. 2024Safeguarding Vision-Language Models Against Patched Visual Prompt Injectors
  4. 2026Image-based Prompt Injection: Hijacking Multimodal LLMs through Visually Embedded Adversarial Instructions
  5. 2026Breaking the weakest link to evade vision language models
  6. 2026Adversarial Diffusion Across Modalities: A Fusion Survey of Attacks, Defenses, and Evaluation for Text, Vision, and Vision-Language Models
  7. 2026Dynamic Adversarial Reinforcement Learning for Robust Multimodal Large Language Models
  8. 2026Adversarial Attacks on Multimodal Large Language Models: A Comprehensive Survey