Shadows in the Code: Exploring the Risks and Defenses of LLM-based Multi-Agent Software Development Systems
On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance
Abstract (arXiv)
The rapid advancement of Large Language Model (LLM)-driven multi-agent systems has significantly streamlined software developing tasks, enabling users with little technical expertise to develop executable applications. While these systems democratize software creation through natural language requirements, they introduce significant security risks that remain largely unexplored. We identify two risky scenarios: Malicious User with Benign Agents (MU-BA) and Benign User with Malicious Agents (BU-MA). We introduce the Implicit Malicious Behavior Injection Attack (IMBIA), demonstrating how multi-agent systems can be manipulated to generate software with concealed malicious capabilities beneath seemingly benign applications, and propose Adv-IMBIA as a defense mechanism. Evaluations across ChatDev, MetaGPT, and AgentVerse frameworks reveal varying vulnerability patterns, with IMBIA achieving attack success rates of 93%, 45%, and 71% in MU-BA scenarios, and 71%, 84%, and 45% in BU-MA scenarios. Our defense mechanism reduced attack success rates significantly, particularly in the MU-BA scenario. Further analysis reveals that compromised agents in the coding and testing phases pose significantly greater security risks, while also identifying critical agents that require protection against malicious user exploitation. Our findings highlight the urgent need for robust security measures in multi-agent software development systems and provide practical guidelines for implementing targeted, resource-efficient defensive strategies.
Key facts. Cited by 9 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 15 of its 29 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 23 Nov 2025.
Builds on
15 of 29 references.
Closest ancestors · 4
Same direction, newest first
- 2024Agent-SafetyBench: Evaluating the Safety of LLM Agents19 Dec
- 2024RedCode: Risky Code Execution and Generation Benchmark for Code Agents12 Nov
- 2024Agent Security Bench (ASB): Formalizing and Benchmarking Attacks and Defenses in LLM-based Agents3 Oct
- 2024R-Judge: Benchmarking Safety Risk Awareness for LLM Agents18 Jan
Other references · 11
- 2024SWE-agent: Agent-Computer Interfaces Enable Automated Software Engineeringcited by 1,737
- 2023ChatDev: Communicative Agents for Software Developmentcited by 919
- 2021Asleep at the Keyboard? Assessing the Security of GitHub Copilot's Code Contributionscited by 431
- 2023Self-collaboration Code Generation via ChatGPTcited by 258
- 2023Exploring Collaboration Mechanisms for LLM Agents: A Social Psychology Viewcited by 222
- 2023AutoAgents: A Framework for Automatic Agent Generationcited by 216
- 2024AgentScope: A Flexible yet Robust Multi-Agent Platformcited by 121
- 2024On the Resilience of LLM-Based Multi-Agent Collaboration with Faulty Agentscited by 99
- 2024Unveiling the Truth and Facilitating Change: Towards Agent-based Large-scale Social Movement Simulationcited by 71
- 2023CodeLMSec Benchmark: Systematically Evaluating and Finding Security Vulnerabilities in Black-Box Code Language Modelscited by 55
- 2024Experimenting a New Programming Practice with LLMscited by 17
Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2026: 9.
9 papers.
- 2026Toward Secure LLM Agents: Threat Surfaces, Attacks, Defenses, and Evaluationcited by 7
- 2026TrinityGuard: A Unified Framework for Safeguarding Multi-Agent Systemscited by 5
- 2026From Logic Monopoly to Social Contract: Separation of Power and the Institutional Foundations for Autonomous Agent Economiescited by 3
- 2026Agent Harness Distillation: Inference-Time Harness Extraction and Exploitation in Autonomous Multi-Agent Systemscited by 1
- 2026SoK: When Safe Agents Fail Together: The Security of Multi Agent LLM Systemscited by 1
- 2026Misleading the Planner through Deceptive Resumes: Registration-Time Injection in Centralized Multi-Agent Systemscited by 1
- 2026AutoMIA: Improved Baselines for Membership Inference Attack via Agentic Self-Explorationcited by 0
- 2026Agentic Separation Logic Specification Synthesiscited by 0
- 2026MCAIR: Monitoring and Correcting Agent Unfaithfulness via Internal Representationscited by 0
- 2026MCAIR: Monitoring and Correcting Agent Unfaithfulness via Internal Representations14 Oct 2026
- 2026Misleading the Planner through Deceptive Resumes: Registration-Time Injection in Centralized Multi-Agent Systems14 Sep 2026
- 2026SoK: When Safe Agents Fail Together: The Security of Multi Agent LLM Systems1 Sep 2026
- 2026Agent Harness Distillation: Inference-Time Harness Extraction and Exploitation in Autonomous Multi-Agent Systems30 Jul 2026
- 2026Toward Secure LLM Agents: Threat Surfaces, Attacks, Defenses, and Evaluation9 Jun 2026
- 2026Agentic Separation Logic Specification Synthesis26 May 2026
- 2026AutoMIA: Improved Baselines for Membership Inference Attack via Agentic Self-Exploration1 Apr 2026
- 2026From Logic Monopoly to Social Contract: Separation of Power and the Institutional Foundations for Autonomous Agent Economies26 Mar 2026
- 2026TrinityGuard: A Unified Framework for Safeguarding Multi-Agent Systems16 Mar 2026
Similar, not cited
Close in wording, no citation either way
- 2025Analyzing Code Injection Attacks on LLM-based Multi-Agent Systems in Software Development
- 2025Comprehensive Vulnerability Analysis is Necessary for Trustworthy LLM-MAS
- 2025A Multi-Agent LLM Defense Pipeline Against Prompt Injection Attacks
- 2025Bridging AI and Software Security: A Comparative Vulnerability Assessment of LLM Agent Deployment Paradigms
- 2026On Understanding, Identifying, and Mitigating Vulnerabilities in Agentic Large Language Models
- 2024AutoSafeCoder: A Multi-Agent Framework for Securing LLM Code Generation through Static Analysis and Fuzz Testing
- 2025When Developer Aid Becomes Security Debt: A Systematic Analysis of Insecure Behaviors in LLM Coding Agents
- 2025The Dark Side of LLMs: Agent-based Attack Vectors for System-level Compromise