Securing AI Agents Against Prompt Injection Attacks
On the map: Retrieval-augmented generation → Privacy and security of RAG
also in 2 more
Abstract (arXiv)
Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) systems have become widely used for enhancing large language model capabilities, but they introduce significant security vulnerabilities through prompt injection attacks. We present a comprehensive benchmark for evaluating prompt injection risks in RAG-enabled AI agents and propose a multi-layered defense framework. Our benchmark includes 847 adversarial test cases across five attack categories: direct injection, context manipulation, instruction override, data exfiltration, and cross-context contamination. We evaluate three defense mechanisms: content filtering with embedding-based anomaly detection, hierarchical system prompt guardrails, and multi-stage response verification, across seven state-of-the-art language models. Our combined framework reduces successful attack rates from 73.2% to 8.7% while maintaining 94.3% of baseline task performance. We release our benchmark dataset and defense implementation to support future research in AI agent security.
Key facts. Cited by 5 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Privacy and security of RAG, one of 15 directions in Retrieval-augmented generation. Builds on 2 of its 7 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 19 Nov 2025.
Builds on
2 of 7 references.
References · 2
- 2022Ignore Previous Prompt: Attack Techniques For Language Modelscited by 832
- 2023Prompt Injection attack against LLM-integrated Applicationscited by 605
Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2026: 5.
5 papers.
- 2026Trojan Hippo: Weaponizing Agent Memory for Data Exfiltrationcited by 12
- 2026SoK: Agentic Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG): Taxonomy, Architectures, Evaluation, and Research Directionscited by 8
- 2026Towards Secure Retrieval-Augmented Generation: A Comprehensive Review of Threats, Defenses and Benchmarkscited by 4
- 2026Adversarial Intent is a Latent Variable: Stateful Trust Inference for Securing Multimodal Agentic RAGcited by 2
- 2026Why Trust Your Agent? Empirical Security Gains from TRiSM-Guided Agentic Workflows in Healthcarecited by 0
- 2026Why Trust Your Agent? Empirical Security Gains from TRiSM-Guided Agentic Workflows in Healthcare27 Jun 2026
- 2026Trojan Hippo: Weaponizing Agent Memory for Data Exfiltration3 May 2026
- 2026Towards Secure Retrieval-Augmented Generation: A Comprehensive Review of Threats, Defenses and Benchmarks23 Mar 2026
- 2026SoK: Agentic Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG): Taxonomy, Architectures, Evaluation, and Research Directions7 Mar 2026
- 2026Adversarial Intent is a Latent Variable: Stateful Trust Inference for Securing Multimodal Agentic RAG24 Feb 2026
Similar, not cited
Close in wording, no citation either way
- 2026A Layered Security Framework Against Prompt Injection in RAG-Based Chatbots
- 2025Exploiting Web Search Tools of AI Agents for Data Exfiltration
- 2025Adversarial Threat Vectors and Risk Mitigation for Retrieval-Augmented Generation Systems
- 2026Evaluation of Prompt Injection Defenses in Large Language Models
- 2025Benchmarking Poisoning Attacks against Retrieval-Augmented Generation
- 2024Towards More Robust Retrieval-Augmented Generation: Evaluating RAG Under Adversarial Poisoning Attacks
- 2026SoK: The Attack Surface of Agentic AI - Tools and Autonomy
- 2026The Landscape of Prompt Injection Threats in LLM Agents: From Taxonomy to Analysis