mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

Securing AI Agents Against Prompt Injection Attacks

arXiv 2511.15759 ↗First posted 19 Nov 2025cs.CR cs.AIcited by 5

On the map: Retrieval-augmented generation → Privacy and security of RAG

also in 2 more
Abstract (arXiv)

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) systems have become widely used for enhancing large language model capabilities, but they introduce significant security vulnerabilities through prompt injection attacks. We present a comprehensive benchmark for evaluating prompt injection risks in RAG-enabled AI agents and propose a multi-layered defense framework. Our benchmark includes 847 adversarial test cases across five attack categories: direct injection, context manipulation, instruction override, data exfiltration, and cross-context contamination. We evaluate three defense mechanisms: content filtering with embedding-based anomaly detection, hierarchical system prompt guardrails, and multi-stage response verification, across seven state-of-the-art language models. Our combined framework reduces successful attack rates from 73.2% to 8.7% while maintaining 94.3% of baseline task performance. We release our benchmark dataset and defense implementation to support future research in AI agent security.

Key facts. Cited by 5 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Privacy and security of RAG, one of 15 directions in Retrieval-augmented generation. Builds on 2 of its 7 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 19 Nov 2025.

Builds on

2 of 7 references.

References · 2

  1. 2022Ignore Previous Prompt: Attack Techniques For Language Modelscited by 832
  2. 2023Prompt Injection attack against LLM-integrated Applicationscited by 605

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Cited by year (2026 to 14 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2026: 5.

5 papers.

Similar, not cited

Close in wording, no citation either way

  1. 2026A Layered Security Framework Against Prompt Injection in RAG-Based Chatbots
  2. 2025Exploiting Web Search Tools of AI Agents for Data Exfiltration
  3. 2025Adversarial Threat Vectors and Risk Mitigation for Retrieval-Augmented Generation Systems
  4. 2026Evaluation of Prompt Injection Defenses in Large Language Models
  5. 2025Benchmarking Poisoning Attacks against Retrieval-Augmented Generation
  6. 2024Towards More Robust Retrieval-Augmented Generation: Evaluating RAG Under Adversarial Poisoning Attacks
  7. 2026SoK: The Attack Surface of Agentic AI - Tools and Autonomy
  8. 2026The Landscape of Prompt Injection Threats in LLM Agents: From Taxonomy to Analysis