Towards Continuous Assurance with Formal Verification and Assurance Cases
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Abstract (arXiv)
Autonomous systems must sustain justified confidence in their correctness and safety across their operational lifecycle-from design and deployment through post-deployment evolution. Traditional assurance methods often separate development-time assurance from runtime assurance, yielding fragmented arguments that cannot adapt to runtime changes or system updates - a significant challenge for assured autonomy. Towards addressing this, we propose a unified Continuous Assurance Framework that integrates design-time, runtime, and evolution-time assurance within a traceable, model-driven workflow as a step towards assured autonomy. In this paper, we specifically instantiate the design-time phase of the framework using two formal verification methods: RoboChart for functional correctness and PRISM for probabilistic risk analysis. We also propose a model-driven transformation pipeline, implemented as an Eclipse plugin, that automatically regenerates structured assurance arguments whenever formal specifications or their verification results change, thereby ensuring traceability. We demonstrate our approach on a nuclear inspection robot scenario, and discuss its alignment with the Trilateral AI Principles, reflecting regulator-endorsed best practices.
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 4 of its 30 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 17 Nov 2025.
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4 of 30 references.
References · 4
- 2021Reliability Assessment and Safety Arguments for Machine Learning Components in System Assurancecited by 16
- 2021ReSonAte: A Runtime Risk Assessment Framework for Autonomous Systemscited by 9
- 2022On Specifying for Trustworthinesscited by 8
- 2022Towards Developing Safety Assurance Cases for Learning-Enabled Medical Cyber-Physical Systemscited by 2
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