mlsanityData to 13 Oct 2026

Ask What Your Country Can Do For You: Towards a Public Red Teaming Model

arXiv 2510.20061 ↗First posted 22 Oct 2025cs.CY cs.AI cs.CRcited by 1

On the map: LLM safety and security → Prompt injection and agent security

Abstract (arXiv)

AI systems have the potential to produce both benefits and harms, but without rigorous and ongoing adversarial evaluation, AI actors will struggle to assess the breadth and magnitude of the AI risk surface. Researchers from the field of systems design have developed several effective sociotechnical AI evaluation and red teaming techniques targeting bias, hate speech, mis/disinformation, and other documented harm classes. However, as increasingly sophisticated AI systems are released into high-stakes sectors (such as education, healthcare, and intelligence-gathering), our current evaluation and monitoring methods are proving less and less capable of delivering effective oversight. In order to actually deliver responsible AI and to ensure AI's harms are fully understood and its security vulnerabilities mitigated, pioneering new approaches to close this "responsibility gap" are now more urgent than ever. In this paper, we propose one such approach, the cooperative public AI red-teaming exercise, and discuss early results of its prior pilot implementations. This approach is intertwined with CAMLIS itself: the first in-person public demonstrator exercise was held in conjunction with CAMLIS 2024. We review the operational design and results of this exercise, the prior National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)'s Assessing the Risks and Impacts of AI (ARIA) pilot exercise, and another similar exercise conducted with the Singapore Infocomm Media Development Authority (IMDA). Ultimately, we argue that this approach is both capable of delivering meaningful results and is also scalable to many AI developing jurisdictions.

Key facts. Cited by 1 paper in the map (data through 13 Oct 2026). Placed in Prompt injection and agent security, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security. Builds on 5 of its 14 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 22 Oct 2025.

Builds on

5 of 14 references.

Closest ancestors · 2

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2024A Safe Harbor for AI Evaluation and Red Teaming7 Mar
  2. 2024Red-Teaming for Generative AI: Silver Bullet or Security Theater?29 Jan

Other references · 3

  1. 2023Sociotechnical Safety Evaluation of Generative AI Systemscited by 156
  2. 2025Reality Check: A New Evaluation Ecosystem Is Necessary to Understand AI's Real World Effectscited by 19
  3. 2024Vernacularizing Taxonomies of Harm is Essential for Operationalizing Holistic AI Safetycited by 4

Built on by

Cited by year (2026 to 13 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2026: 1.

1 paper.

Similar, not cited

Close in wording, no citation either way

  1. 2025OpenAI's Approach to External Red Teaming for AI Models and Systems
  2. 2024The Human Factor in AI Red Teaming: Perspectives from Social and Collaborative Computing
  3. 2024AI red-teaming is a sociotechnical problem: on values, labor, and harms
  4. 2024Red-Teaming for Inducing Societal Bias in Large Language Models
  5. 2026A Translational Note on AI Safety Evaluation
  6. 2025Red Teaming AI Red Teaming
  7. 2026Red Teaming LLMs as Socio-Technical Practice: From Exploration and Data Creation to Evaluation
  8. 2025When Testing AI Tests Us: Safeguarding Mental Health on the Digital Frontlines