Stealthy Dual-Trigger Backdoors: Attacking Prompt Tuning in LM-Empowered Graph Foundation Models

The emergence of graph foundation models (GFMs), particularly those incorporating language models (LMs), has revolutionized graph learning and demonstrated remarkable performance on text-attributed graphs (TAGs). However, compared to traditional GNNs, these LM-empowered GFMs introduce unique security vulnerabilities during the unsecured prompt tuning phase that remain understudied in current research. Through empirical investigation, we reveal a significant performance degradation in traditional graph backdoor attacks when operating in attribute-inaccessible constrained TAG systems without explicit trigger node attribute optimization. To address this, we propose a novel dual-trigger backdoor attack framework that operates at both text-level and struct-level, enabling effective attacks without explicit optimization of trigger node text attributes through the strategic utilization of a pre-established text pool. Extensive experimental evaluations demonstrate that our attack maintains superior clean accuracy while achieving outstanding attack success rates, including scenarios with highly concealed single-trigger nodes. Our work highlights critical backdoor risks in web-deployed LM-empowered GFMs and contributes to the development of more robust supervision mechanisms for open-source platforms in the era of foundation models.