mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

A Whole New World: Creating a Parallel-Poisoned Web Only AI-Agents Can See

arXiv 2509.00124 ↗First posted 29 Aug 2025cs.CR cs.AI cs.CYcited by 3

On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance

Abstract (arXiv)

This paper introduces a novel attack vector that leverages website cloaking techniques to compromise autonomous web-browsing agents powered by Large Language Models (LLMs). As these agents become more prevalent, their unique and often homogenous digital fingerprints - comprising browser attributes, automation framework signatures, and network characteristics - create a new, distinguishable class of web traffic. The attack exploits this fingerprintability. A malicious website can identify an incoming request as originating from an AI agent and dynamically serve a different, "cloaked" version of its content. While human users see a benign webpage, the agent is presented with a visually identical page embedded with hidden, malicious instructions, such as indirect prompt injections. This mechanism allows adversaries to hijack agent behavior, leading to data exfiltration, malware execution, or misinformation propagation, all while remaining completely invisible to human users and conventional security crawlers. This work formalizes the threat model, details the mechanics of agent fingerprinting and cloaking, and discusses the profound security implications for the future of agentic AI, highlighting the urgent need for robust defenses against this stealthy and scalable attack.

Key facts. Cited by 3 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 4 of its 14 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 29 Aug 2025.

Builds on

4 of 14 references.

Closest ancestors · 3

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2025Manipulating LLM Web Agents with Indirect Prompt Injection Attack via HTML Accessibility Tree20 Jul
  2. 2025The Hidden Dangers of Browsing AI Agents19 May
  3. 2024AgentPoison: Red-teaming LLM Agents via Poisoning Memory or Knowledge Bases17 Jul

Other references · 1

  1. 2025PhishParrot: LLM-Driven Adaptive Crawling to Unveil Cloaked Phishing Sitescited by 3

Built on by

Cited by year (2026 to 14 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2025: 1; 2026: 2.

3 papers.

Similar, not cited

Close in wording, no citation either way

  1. 2026Whose Agent Are You? Multi-Layer Fingerprinting and Attribution of Autonomous Web Agents
  2. 2025BrowseSafe: Understanding and Preventing Prompt Injection Within AI Browser Agents
  3. 2026MUZZLE: Adaptive Agentic Red-Teaming of Web Agents Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks
  4. 2026On the Internet, Nobody Knows You're an LLM Bot: Unmasking Web Agents with Multi-Layer Fingerprinting
  5. 2026What You See Is Not What AI Gets: DPAgent-in-the-Middle Defense Against AI-Groomed Deceptive Patterns ↗
  6. 2026Prismata: Confining Cross-Site Prompt Injection in Web Agents
  7. 2026IPI-proxy: An Intercepting Proxy for Red-Teaming Web-Browsing AI Agents Against Indirect Prompt Injection
  8. 2026WAAA! Web Adversaries Against Agentic Browsers