mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

PhantomLint: Principled Detection of Hidden LLM Prompts in Structured Documents

arXiv 2508.17884 ↗First posted 25 Aug 2025cs.CRcited by 3

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Abstract (arXiv)

Hidden LLM prompts have appeared in online documents with increasing frequency. Their goal is to trigger indirect prompt injection attacks while remaining undetected from human oversight, to manipulate LLM-powered automated document processing systems, against applications as diverse as r'esum'e screeners through to academic peer review processes. Detecting hidden LLM prompts is therefore important for ensuring trust in AI-assisted human decision making. This paper presents the first principled approach to hidden LLM prompt detection in structured documents. We implement our approach in a prototype tool called PhantomLint. We evaluate PhantomLint against a corpus of 3,402 documents, including both PDF and HTML documents, and covering academic paper preprints, CVs, theses and more. We find that our approach is generally applicable against a wide range of methods for hiding LLM prompts from visual inspection, has a very low false positive rate (approx. 0.092%), is practically useful for detecting hidden LLM prompts in real documents, while achieving acceptable performance.

Key facts. Cited by 3 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). First posted on arXiv 25 Aug 2025.

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Citing papers per year: 2025: 1; 2026: 2.

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  1. 2025Multilingual Hidden Prompt Injection Attacks on LLM-Based Academic Reviewing
  2. 2024PROMPTFUZZ: Harnessing Fuzzing Techniques for Robust Testing of Prompt Injection in LLMs
  3. 2026Indirect Prompt Injection in the Wild: An Empirical Study of Prevalence, Techniques, and Objectives
  4. 2025Detecting LLM-Generated Peer Reviews
  5. 2024Rag and Roll: An End-to-End Evaluation of Indirect Prompt Manipulations in LLM-based Application Frameworks
  6. 2025Too Easily Fooled? Prompt Injection Breaks LLMs on Frustratingly Simple Multiple-Choice Questions
  7. 2024Phantom: General Backdoor Attacks on Retrieval Augmented Language Generation
  8. 2025Invisible Prompts, Visible Threats: Malicious Font Injection in External Resources for Large Language Models