mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

Deep Ignorance: Filtering Pretraining Data Builds Tamper-Resistant Safeguards into Open-Weight LLMs

arXiv 2508.06601 ↗First posted 8 Aug 2025cs.LG cs.AIcited by 42

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Abstract (arXiv)

Open-weight AI systems offer unique benefits, including enhanced transparency, open research, and decentralized access. However, they are vulnerable to tampering attacks which can efficiently elicit harmful behaviors by modifying weights or activations. Currently, there is not yet a robust science of open-weight model risk management. Existing safety fine-tuning methods and other post-training techniques have struggled to make LLMs resistant to more than a few dozen steps of adversarial fine-tuning. In this paper, we investigate whether filtering text about dual-use topics from training data can prevent unwanted capabilities and serve as a more tamper-resistant safeguard. We introduce a multi-stage pipeline for scalable data filtering and show that it offers a tractable and effective method for minimizing biothreat proxy knowledge in LLMs. We pretrain multiple 6.9B-parameter models from scratch and find that they exhibit substantial resistance to adversarial fine-tuning attacks on up to 10,000 steps and 300M tokens of biothreat-related text -- outperforming existing post-training baselines by over an order of magnitude -- with no observed degradation to unrelated capabilities. However, while filtered models lack internalized dangerous knowledge, we find that they can still leverage such information when it is provided in context (e.g., via search tool augmentation), demonstrating a need for a defense-in-depth approach. Overall, these findings help to establish pretraining data curation as a promising layer of defense for open-weight AI systems.

Key facts. Cited by 42 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). First posted on arXiv 8 Aug 2025.

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Citing papers per year: 2025: 10; 2026: 32.

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  1. 2025Inoculation Prompting: Eliciting traits from LLMs during training can suppress them at test-timecited by 43
  2. 2026Model Spec Midtraining: Improving How Alignment Training Generalizescited by 20
  3. 2025Beyond Linear Probes: Dynamic Safety Monitoring for Language Modelscited by 16
  4. 2026Shaping capabilities with token-level data filteringcited by 13
  5. 2025Self-Jailbreaking: Language Models Can Reason Themselves Out of Safety Alignment After Benign Reasoning Trainingcited by 12
  6. 2025Beyond Data Filtering: Knowledge Localization for Capability Removal in LLMscited by 11
  7. 2025What Is The Political Content in LLMs' Pre- and Post-Training Data?cited by 7
  8. 2026When Should We Introduce Safety Interventions During Pretraining?cited by 7
  9. 2025Train Once, Answer All: Many Pretraining Experiments for the Cost of Onecited by 6
  10. 2026Antibody: Strengthening Defense Against Harmful Fine-Tuning for Large Language Models via Attenuating Harmful Gradient Influencecited by 6
  11. 2025AI Generated Child Sexual Abuse Material -- What's the Harm?cited by 5
  12. 2025Downgrade to Upgrade: Optimizer Simplification Enhances Robustness in LLM Unlearningcited by 4
30 more
  1. 2026Surgery: Mitigating Harmful Fine-Tuning for Large Language Models via Attention Sinkcited by 4
  2. 2026Early Data Exposure Improves Robustness to Subsequent Fine-Tuningcited by 4
  3. 2026Reward Models Inherit Value Biases from Pretrainingcited by 3
  4. 2026Position: Don't Just "Fix it in Post": A Science of AI Must Study Training Dynamicscited by 3
  5. 2026Bergson: An Open Source Library for Data Attributioncited by 3
  6. 2026Modular Pretraining Enables Access Controlcited by 3
  7. 2026Position: Capability Control Should be a Separate Goal From Alignmentcited by 2
  8. 2026TamperBench: Systematically Stress-Testing LLM Safety Under Fine-Tuning and Tamperingcited by 2
  9. 2026Reflections and New Directions for Human-Centered Large Language Modelscited by 2
  10. 2026Mark, Don't Erase: Token Inoculation for Dual-Use Knowledge in LLMscited by 2
  11. 2025Best Practices for Biorisk Evaluations on Open-Weight Bio-Foundation Modelscited by 1
  12. 2026Steerability of Instrumental-Convergence Tendencies in LLMscited by 1
  13. 2026No More, No Less: Least-Privilege Language Modelscited by 1
  14. 2026Beyond Safe Data: Pretraining-Stage Alignment with Regular Safety Reflectioncited by 1
  15. 2026Data Attribution of Emergent Misalignment with Persona Featurescited by 1
  16. 2026Synthetic Persona Pretraining: Alignment from Token Zerocited by 1
  17. 2026The Unequal Influence of Bad Advice: Using Training Data Attribution to Modulate Emergent Misalignmentcited by 1
  18. 2025Getting Your Indices in a Row: Full-Text Search for LLM Training Data for Real Worldcited by 0
  19. 2026Sockpuppetting: Jailbreaking LLMs by Combining Prefilling with Optimizationcited by 0
  20. 2026Alignment-Aware Model Adaptation via Feedback-Guided Optimizationcited by 0
  21. 2026The Biosecurity Blind Spot: Systematic Dual-use Detection in Open Science Infrastructurecited by 0
  22. 2026Validity Threats for Foundation Model Researchcited by 0
  23. 2026Position: Preventing AI-Generated CSAM Necessitates New Approaches to AI Safetycited by 0
  24. 2026Fool's Gold: Defensive Deception Against Safety-Removal Attacks on Open-Weight Modelscited by 0
  25. 2026The Safeguard Worked. Is the LLM System Safer?cited by 0
  26. 2026Can Data Attribution Filter Out Subliminal Learning? Not Reliablycited by 0
  27. 2026MASCRDM: Multi-Agent System for Compliance Risk Detection and Mitigation in Training Process of Large Language Modelscited by 0
  28. 2026Preemptive LLM Unlearning against Forbidden Capability Acquisition via Gradient Sealingcited by 0
  29. 2026Removing Information Content Does Not Certify Tamper Resistance in Open-Weight Modelscited by 0
  30. 2026RA2: Retain-Anchored Attraction Preserves Forget-Adjacent Utility in LLM Unlearningcited by 0