mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

Corrigibility as a Singular Target: A Vision for Inherently Reliable Foundation Models

arXiv 2506.03056 ↗First posted 3 Jun 2025cs.AI cs.CY cs.LGcited by 2

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Abstract (arXiv)

Foundation models (FMs) face a critical safety challenge: as capabilities scale, instrumental convergence drives default trajectories toward loss of human control, potentially culminating in existential catastrophe. Current alignment approaches struggle with value specification complexity and fail to address emergent power-seeking behaviors. We propose "Corrigibility as a Singular Target" (CAST)-designing FMs whose overriding objective is empowering designated human principals to guide, correct, and control them. This paradigm shift from static value-loading to dynamic human empowerment transforms instrumental drives: self-preservation serves only to maintain the principal's control; goal modification becomes facilitating principal guidance. We present a comprehensive empirical research agenda spanning training methodologies (RLAIF, SFT, synthetic data generation), scalability testing across model sizes, and demonstrations of controlled instructability. Our vision: FMs that become increasingly responsive to human guidance as capabilities grow, offering a path to beneficial AI that remains as tool-like as possible, rather than supplanting human judgment. This addresses the core alignment problem at its source, preventing the default trajectory toward misaligned instrumental convergence.

Key facts. Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 7 of its 18 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 3 Jun 2025.

Builds on

7 of 18 references.

References · 7

  1. 2022Training language models to follow instructions with human feedbackcited by 15,971
  2. 2022Constitutional AI: Harmlessness from AI Feedbackcited by 3,050
  3. 2020Learning to summarize from human feedbackcited by 2,588
  4. 2020Artificial Intelligence, Values and Alignmentcited by 448
  5. 2016Cooperative Inverse Reinforcement Learningcited by 300
  6. 2019Risks from Learned Optimization in Advanced Machine Learning Systemscited by 258
  7. 2024Safety Cases: How to Justify the Safety of Advanced AI Systemscited by 48

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Cited by year (2026 to 14 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2025: 1; 2026: 1.

2 papers.

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Close in wording, no citation either way

  1. 2026Mitigating loss of control in advanced AI systems through instrumental goal trajectories
  2. 2026Position: Capability Control Should be a Separate Goal From Alignment
  3. 2026Instrumental Choices: Measuring the Propensity of LLM Agents to Pursue Instrumental Behaviors
  4. 2026The Institutional Scaling Law: Non-Monotonic Fitness, Capability-Trust Divergence, and Symbiogenetic Scaling in Generative AI
  5. 2025Neurodivergent Influenceability as a Contingent Solution to the AI Alignment Problem
  6. 2026Agentic Pressure: The Endogenous Entropy of Reliable Autonomy
  7. 2025Research Superalignment Should Advance Now with Alternating Competence and Conformity Optimization
  8. 2026Institutional AI: A Governance Framework for Distributional AGI Safety