Military AI Needs Technically-Informed Regulation to Safeguard AI Research and its Applications
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Abstract (arXiv)
Military weapon systems and command-and-control infrastructure augmented by artificial intelligence (AI) have seen rapid development and deployment in recent years. However, the sociotechnical impacts of AI on combat systems, military decision-making, and the norms of warfare have been understudied. We focus on a specific subset of lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) that use AI for targeting or battlefield decisions. We refer to this subset as AI-powered lethal autonomous weapon systems (AI-LAWS) and argue that they introduce novel risks -- including unanticipated escalation, poor reliability in unfamiliar environments, and erosion of human oversight -- all of which threaten both military effectiveness and the openness of AI research. These risks cannot be addressed by high-level policy alone; effective regulation must be grounded in the technical behavior of AI models. We argue that AI researchers must be involved throughout the regulatory lifecycle. Thus, we propose a clear, behavior-based definition of AI-LAWS -- systems that introduce unique risks through their use of modern AI -- as a foundation for technically grounded regulation, given that existing frameworks do not distinguish them from conventional LAWS. Using this definition, we propose several technically-informed policy directions and invite greater participation from the AI research community in military AI policy discussions.
Key facts. Cited by 4 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 12 of its 122 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 23 May 2025.
Builds on
12 of 122 references.
References · 12
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Citing papers per year: 2025: 1; 2026: 3.
4 papers.
- 2025The Secret Agenda: LLMs Strategically Lie and Our Current Safety Tools Are Blindcited by 8
- 2026AI Researchers Must Help Lead Arms Control to Mitigate Military AI Riskscited by 0
- 2026Reframing AI Loss of Control: What Control Is, How to Have It, How to Lose Itcited by 0
- 2026An Investigation of the NeurIPS and ICML 2025 Position Trackscited by 0
- 2026An Investigation of the NeurIPS and ICML 2025 Position Tracks6 Jul 2026
- 2026AI Researchers Must Help Lead Arms Control to Mitigate Military AI Risks10 Jun 2026
- 2026Reframing AI Loss of Control: What Control Is, How to Have It, How to Lose It19 May 2026
- 2025The Secret Agenda: LLMs Strategically Lie and Our Current Safety Tools Are Blind23 Sep 2025