Securing Transfer-Learned Networks with Reverse Homomorphic Encryption

The growing body of literature on training-data reconstruction attacks raises significant concerns about deploying neural network classifiers trained on sensitive data. However, differentially private (DP) training (e.g. using DP-SGD) can defend against such attacks with large training datasets causing only minimal loss of network utility. Folklore, heuristics, and (albeit pessimistic) DP bounds suggest this fails for networks trained with small per-class datasets, yet to the best of our knowledge the literature offers no compelling evidence. We directly demonstrate this vulnerability by significantly extending reconstruction attack capabilities under a realistic adversary threat model for few-shot transfer learned image classifiers. We design new white-box and black-box attacks and find that DP-SGD is unable to defend against these without significant classifier utility loss. To address this, we propose a novel homomorphic encryption (HE) method that protects training data without degrading model's accuracy. Conventional HE secures model's input data and requires costly homomorphic implementation of the entire classifier. In contrast, our new scheme is computationally efficient and protects training data rather than input data. This is achieved by means of a simple role-reversal where classifier input data is unencrypted but transfer-learned weights are encrypted. Classifier outputs remain encrypted, thus preventing both white-box and black-box (and any other) training-data reconstruction attacks. Under this new scheme only a trusted party with a private decryption key can obtain the classifier class decisions.