From Incidents to Insights: Patterns of Responsibility following AI Harms
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Abstract (arXiv)
The AI Incident Database was inspired by aviation safety databases, which enable collective learning from failures to prevent future incidents. The database documents hundreds of AI failures, collected from the news and media. However, criticism highlights that the AIID's reliance on media reporting limits its utility for learning about implementation failures. In this paper, we accept that the AIID falls short in its original mission, but argue that by looking beyond technically-focused learning, the dataset can provide new, highly valuable insights: specifically, opportunities to learn about patterns between developers, deployers, victims, wider society, and law-makers that emerge after AI failures. Through a three-tier mixed-methods analysis of 962 incidents and 4,743 related reports from the AIID, we examine patterns across incidents, focusing on cases with public responses tagged in the database. We identify 'typical' incidents found in the AIID, from Tesla crashes to deepfake scams. Focusing on this interplay between relevant parties, we uncover patterns in accountability and social expectations of responsibility. We find that the presence of identifiable responsible parties does not necessarily lead to increased accountability. The likelihood of a response and what it amounts to depends highly on context, including who built the technology, who was harmed, and to what extent. Controversy-rich incidents provide valuable data about societal reactions, including insights into social expectations. Equally informative are cases where controversy is notably absent. This work shows that the AIID's value lies not just in preventing technical failures, but in documenting patterns of harms and of institutional response and social learning around AI incidents. These patterns offer crucial insights for understanding how society adapts to and governs emerging AI technologies.
Key facts. Cited by 5 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). First posted on arXiv 7 May 2025.
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Citing papers per year: 2025: 1; 2026: 4.
5 papers.
- 2025Dimensional Characterization and Pathway Modeling for Catastrophic AI Riskscited by 1
- 2026Why AI Harms Can't Be Fixed One Identity at a Time: What 5300 Incident Reports Reveal About Intersectionalitycited by 0
- 2026RiskNet: A large-scale dataset of AI risk incidents from news with alignment and multi-dimensional annotationscited by 0
- 2026Physiological Noise Augmentation Improves Non-Invasive Brain-to-Speechcited by 0
- 2026Unaccountable Delegation, Fading Skills: Mapping the Risks of Workplace AI Agentscited by 0
- 2026Unaccountable Delegation, Fading Skills: Mapping the Risks of Workplace AI Agents9 Aug 2026
- 2026Physiological Noise Augmentation Improves Non-Invasive Brain-to-Speech6 Jul 2026
- 2026RiskNet: A large-scale dataset of AI risk incidents from news with alignment and multi-dimensional annotations7 Jun 2026
- 2026Why AI Harms Can't Be Fixed One Identity at a Time: What 5300 Incident Reports Reveal About Intersectionality27 Apr 2026
- 2025Dimensional Characterization and Pathway Modeling for Catastrophic AI Risks8 Aug 2025