mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

Artificial Intelligence in Government: Why People Feel They Lose Control

arXiv 2505.01085 ↗First posted 2 May 2025cs.CY cs.AIcited by 1

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Abstract (arXiv)

The use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in public administration is expanding rapidly, moving from automating routine tasks to deploying generative and agentic systems that autonomously act on goals. While AI promises greater efficiency and responsiveness, its integration into government functions raises concerns about fairness, transparency, and accountability. This article applies principal-agent theory (PAT) to conceptualize AI adoption as a special case of delegation, highlighting three core tensions: assessability (can decisions be understood?), dependency (can the delegation be reversed?), and contestability (can decisions be challenged?). These structural challenges may lead to a "failure-by-success" dynamic, where early functional gains obscure long-term risks to democratic legitimacy. To test this framework, we conducted a pre-registered factorial survey experiment across tax, welfare, and law enforcement domains. Our findings show that although efficiency gains initially bolster trust, they simultaneously reduce citizens' perceived control. When the structural risks come to the foreground, institutional trust and perceived control both drop sharply, suggesting that hidden costs of AI adoption significantly shape public attitudes. The study demonstrates that PAT offers a powerful lens for understanding the institutional and political implications of AI in government, emphasizing the need for policymakers to address delegation risks transparently to maintain public trust.

Key facts. Cited by 1 paper in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 10 of its 66 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 2 May 2025.

Builds on

10 of 66 references.

References · 10

  1. 2017Attention Is All You Needcited by 60,361
  2. 2020Language Models are Few-Shot Learnerscited by 32,419
  3. 2023Generative Agents: Interactive Simulacra of Human Behaviorcited by 3,568
  4. 2019Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI): Concepts, Taxonomies, Opportunities and Challenges toward Responsible AIcited by 1,552
  5. 2020On Faithfulness and Factuality in Abstractive Summarizationcited by 900
  6. 2019The Ethics of AI Ethics -- An Evaluation of Guidelinescited by 129
  7. 2024Large Language Models Reflect the Ideology of their Creatorscited by 57
  8. 2024AI for bureaucratic productivity: Measuring the potential of AI to help automate 143 million UK government transactionscited by 4
  9. 2025Artificial Intelligence in Deliberation: The AI Penalty and the Emergence of a New Deliberative Dividecited by 4
  10. 2025What do people expect from Artificial Intelligence? Public opinion on alignment in AI moderation from Germany and the United Statescited by 1

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Cited by year (2026 to 14 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2026: 1.

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Similar, not cited

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  1. 2026A Technical Typology of AI Systems in Public Administration
  2. 2025Oversight Structures for Agentic AI in Public-Sector Organizations
  3. 2025Democracy-in-Silico: Institutional Design as Alignment in AI-Governed Polities
  4. 2025Artificial Authority: From Machine Minds to Political Alignments. An Experimental Analysis of Democratic and Autocratic Biases in Large-Language Models
  5. 2026Assistant or Actor? Student Trust, Control, and Delegation Regret When Using a General-Purpose AI Agent
  6. 2026Delegation Without Living Governance
  7. 2026Trust or Check? Understanding the (Evolutionary) Dynamics of User Trust in AI Systems
  8. 2026I Can't Believe It's Corrupt: Evaluating Corruption in Multi-Agent Governance Systems